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Problems of Interpretation m Asylum
and Withholding of Deportation




Early immigration statutes recognized the need to protect
aliens from persecution. In 1875, Congress excluded criminals from
the lenient U.S. mmigration policy but created an exception for
aliens convicted of political crimes.1 Although this exception
protected only a select group, it set the stage for Congress to
develop the concept of political asylum.
In 1950, Congress passed the Internal Security Act,2 which
prevented deportation of an alien to any country where the alien
would be subject to physical persecution. In 1952, Congress passed
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),3 which authorized the
U.S. Attorney General to withhold the deportation of an alien who
was subject to physical persecution in his homeland. Although
INA section 243(h) applied only in deportation proceedings, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could use its parole
power to grant relief to aliens in exclusion proceedings.'
* Professor of Law, Flonda State University, College of Law. B.A., Long Island
University, 1960;.J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1963; LL.M. (International Law), New York
University, 1964. I wish to thank Patricia Dawson for her research assistance.
1. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. The exclusion provision covered
"persons who [were] undergoing a sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious
crimes other than political or growing out of or the result of such political offenses." Id.
2. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010.
3. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66
Stat. 163, 214 [hereinafter INA].
4. The parole procedure provided an emergency device to allow aliens to enter the
United States, particularly when no INA section covered the specific situation. Because
an alien who received parole did not actually "enter" the United States, the parole
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In 1968, the Umted States acceded to the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 5 As a result, the Umted States bound
itself to Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention Relating to the
Status; of Refugees (Convention).6  Because Article 33 of the
Conventionprevents the return of a refugee to any country where
the refugee's life or freedom is threatened, this accession imposed
new obligations on the Umted States.7 This withdrew the U.S.
Attorney General's discretion to grant relief from deportation.
The Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act)8 amended INA
section 243(h) to mandate the withholding of deportation.
Additionally, this section applied to -exclusion proceedings.'
Specifically, the Umted States could not deport an alien whose "life
or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership m a particular social group, or political
opimon."'  Thus, the language of amended section 243(h)
substantially reflected the "non-refoulement provision" m Article
33 of the Convention. The Refugee Act further granted "asylum
status"" to those aliens who could show a "well-founded fear of
procedure failed to adequately address an alien's request for asylum. Moreover, the
Refugee Act allowed the parole of refugees only for "compelling reasons in the public
interest." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 102,107 (amending
INA § 212(d)(5)) [hereinafter Refugee Act].
5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
6. Convention Relating to the Status-of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention]. Article I of the Protocol obligates the parties "to
apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive to the Convention to refugees as defined." Protocol,
supra note 5.
7. Article 33.1 provides as follows:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life.or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.1.
8. Refugee Act, supra note 4.
9. Id. § 203(e). The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to require the
withholding of deportation of aliens in "exclusion as well as deportation, proceedings." H.
R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1979).
10. The language "alien's life or freedom would be threatened" replaced the previous
language "would be subject to persecution." Addittonally, Congress expanded the grounds
for relief to include "nationality" and "membership in a particular group." Id.
11. The asylum section provides m part as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
256
1996] The Immigration and Nationality Act 257
persecution," thus qualifying them as refugees." Unlike section
243(h), however, asylum relief under section 208 was within the
U.S. Attorney General's discretion.13
Section 243(h) does not grant permanent relief to an alien
whose deportation has been withheld. Unlike an alien granted
asylum,' 4 an alien cannot adjust his status under section 243(h). 5
Furthermore, despite the mandatory nature of this section, an alien
seeking withholding of deportation bears a heavier burden
regarding his persecution claim. 6 Additionally, if an alien faces
persecution in his homeland, INA section 243(a) allows the Umted
States to deport him to a country that will accept him. 7
The Refugee Act further amended section 243(h) to cover
alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).
Refugee Act, supra note 4, § 201(b), 94 Stat. at 105 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(1994)).
12. INA § 101(a)(42) provides in part:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
group, or political opinion
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).'
13. An alien who is denied asylum may still qualify for relief under section 243(h) if
he can show it is more likely than not he would face persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429-30 (1984). This is a higher standard than that required for asylum. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 421 (1987). An asylum application is also considered an
application for withholding deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208-3(b) (1995).
14. An alien granted asylum may adjust his status to that of a lawful- permanent
resident if he has been physically present in the United States for at least one year after
receiving asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(ii) (1995). The alien's admission for permanent
residence is recorded as of the date one year before approval of the alien's application.
Id. § 209.2(0.
15. Unlike an alien granted asylum, an alien whose deportation is withheld cannot
adjust his status. See id. § 209.2(a). Thus, the withholding of deportation does not lead to
permanent residence and the Attorney General can revoke the withholding if conditions
have changed in the country to which deportation was directed. Id, § 208.24(b)(1).
16. Compare INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,425 (1984) (holding that an alien must show
clear probability of persecution) with INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 (1987)
(holding that an alien is not required to prove clear probability of persecution to satisfy
"well-founded fear" test).
17. With certain exceptions, the alien can designate the country to which he wishes to
be deported. If that country rejects the alien, the U.S. Attorney General may deport the
alien to his country of citizenship. If this is unsuccessful, the statute sets out other
alternatives. INA § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1994). The U.S. Attorney General,
however, cannot deport an alien to a country where the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened. Id. § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
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exclusion proceedings. 8 Deportation proceedings seek an alien's
removal from the United States, whereas exclusion proceedings
seek to bar his entry;' 9 m both proceedings, however, the Umted
States considers an alien within its territonal jursdiction. The
application 'of section 243(h) to exclusion proceedings has stirred
little controversy.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council.' the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the extraterrtonal application of section 243(h). The
United States defended its interdiction of Haitians on the ground
that section 243(h) did not apply to aliens on the high seas. This
position, however, conflicts with U.S. obligations under the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,2' which requires the
Uited States to conform to Article 33 of the Convention.
In light of the continuing interdiction problems, Part II of this
Article evaluates the notion of non-refoulement and the relation-
ship between INA section 243(h) ' and Article 33 of the Conven-
18. The Act no longer requires that "the alien would be subject to persecution," but
that the "alien's lif6 or freedom would be threatened." It also added "nationality" and
"membership in a particilar social group, or political opinion" as possible grounds for
relief. Refugee Act, supra note 4, at § 243(h)(1).
19. Deportable aliens comprise five classes. Deportation may be based on the
following: (1) excludability at time of entry, adjustment of status, or violation of status; (2)
conviction of a crime; (3) failure to register and falsification of documents; (4) security and
related grounds; and (5) becoming a public charge. INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1994).
Excludable aliens comprise nine classes. The following grounds justify exclusion: (1)
health, (2) criminal, (3) security, (4) public charge, (5) lack of a labor certification and lack
of qualifications for certain immigrants, (6) illegal entry, (7) failure to meet documentary
requirements, (8) ineligibility for citizenship, and (9) miscellaneous grounds. Id. § 212(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). See also THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 339-41, 535-42 (3d ed. 1995); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY 311-12, 410-14 (1991).
Aliens who have "entered" the United States are entitled to deportation proceedings,
whereas those who have not "entered" are entitled to exclusion proceedings. An entry
occurs when there has been "(1) a crossing mto the territorial limits of the United States,
i.e., physical presence; plus (2) inspection and admission by an immigration officer , or
(3) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point , coupled
with (4) freedom from restraint." In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973).
20. 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2552 (1993).
21. Article 1 of.the Protocol requires the parties to apply Articles 2 through 34 of the
Convention to refugees. Protocol, supra note 5.
22. Section 243(h)(1) provides:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien
described in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
[Vol. 1.8:255
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tion. Part II concludes that one may interpret.both provisions to
prevent interdiction of aliens on the high seas.
Part III critically examines the INA section that demes relief
- to an alien who, "having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of the United States."' The provision does not clarify whether
separate findings are required for the alien's conviction and his
danger to the commumty.24 Contrary to holdings of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)25 and U.S. courts,2 6 this Article
suggests that the courts should require separate findings of the
alien's conviction and of the alien's dangerousness.
Part IV discusses the "political opinion" doctrine. The BIA
and the courts have applied this doctrine inconsistently.27 In INS
INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994).
23. Id. § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B). Additionally, section 243(h) denies
an alien relief if he or she: (1) persecuted others; (2) committed a senous nonpolitical crime
in another country before entering the United States, and is a danger to the security of the
United States. Id. § 243(h)(2)(A), (C), (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A), (C), (D).
24. The language of INA § 243(h)(2)(B), (D) parallels that of Article 33.2 of the
Convention. The Convention provides:
The benefit of [Article 33.1] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.2.
25. See In re CarbaUe, 19 1. & N. Dec. 357 (1986) (deciding there is no separate finding
required that alien pose a danger to the community). The BIA is within the Department
of Justice and is under the general supervision of the Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review. The BIA consists of a chairman and eight other members; however,
the chairman may divide the BIA into three-member panels. A majority of the permanent
BIA members constitutes a quorum for sitting en banc. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1995). The
BIA has jurisdiction to hear appeals from immigration judges in exclusion and deportation
cases. Id. § 3.1(b).
26. See AI-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. '1995) (finding aggravated felony
conviction conclusively disqualifies alien from section 243(h) relief); Martins v. INS, 972
F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming requirement of only one finding based on legislative
history); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (lith Cir. 1988) (deciding statute's cause and
effect relationslup between conviction and dangerousness requires only a finding of convic-
tion).
27. See, e.g., Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th
Cir. 1990) (finding neutrality does not constitute political opinion); Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding neutrality is political opinion under the
Refugee Act); In re Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988) (determining alien
must hold a principled position of neutrality to have a political opinion); In re Vigil, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988) (denying alien relief because he did not express neutrality to
anyone).
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v. Elias-Zacartas,28 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this conflict
but did not define the scope of the "political opinion" doctnne.
An alien's neutrality becomes an issue when there is a
struggle between guerrillas and the legitimate government in the
alien's homeland. An alien may express his neutrality by announ-
cing that he is not taking sides29 or by refusing to join a particidlar
faction.3 In INS v. Elias-Zacartas,31 the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the.Ninth Circuit's attempt to vitalize the term "political
opinion."32 When an- alien cannot successfully show a political
opinion, the Ninth Circuit adopts the concept of "imputed political
opinion."'33 Other courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's
approach in relying on this concept to grant an alien relief'3
Part V concludes that it remains unclear whether the imputed
political opinion doctrine applies when the persecutor cynically
attributes a political opinion to an alien.35 In light of the rationale
behind the doctrine, courts should not apply the imputation theory
28. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). The Supreme Court's intervention was predictable. The
Eleventh Circuit in Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert denedi,
502 U.S. 1122 (1992), agreed that section 243(h) applies only when the alien is physically
within the U.S. territory. In Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992),
the Second Circuit applied the statute extraterritonally.
29. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286; Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395.(9th Cir.
1985).
30. See Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989); Del Valle v. INS,
776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
31. 502 U.S.. 478 (1992). The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view thar the
guerrillas' attempt to conscript the alien into its military forces necessarily constituted
persecution on account of political opinion. Id. at 481.
32. Nassen v. Moschorak, 34 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1994); Zacanas v. INS, 921 F.2d 844
(9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom., INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. "478 (1992); Ramirez Rivas
v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988);
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
33. See Ramirez Rivas, 899 F.2d at 867; Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988);
Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435; Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). In
Elias-Zacaras, the Supreme Court neither rejected nor approved the theory. 502 U.S. at
482. In Canas-Segovia v. INS, ?70 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit assured
the parties that "[i]mputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after Elias-
Zacartas."
34. See, e.g., Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754,760 (1st Cir. 1992); Alvarez-Flores v. INS,
909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F Supp.- 1219" (N.D. I1. 1993).
35. In Lazo-Majano, the court found that a sergeant m the Salvadoran military had
cynically imputed 'an opinion to the alien. 813 F.2d at 1435. The court noted:."Zuniga
knows that Olimpia is only a poor domestic and washerwoman. She does not participate
in politics." Id. The court then sanctioned the cynical imputation: "Even if she had no
political opinion and was innocent of a single reflection on the government of her country,
the cynical imputation of political opinion to her is what counts " Id
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to such circumstances.3 6 Courts should apply the political opinion
critenon more liberally to allow an alien the opportumty to show
a threat of persecution.
II. NON-REFOULEMENT AND THE ALIEN
A. Section 243(h) of the INA
After the Umted States ratified the Umted Nations
Protocol,3 7 INA section 243(h) conflicted with Article 33 of the
Convention. 8 Section 243(h) granted the U.S. Attorney General
discretion to withhold deportation, whereas the Convention made
relief mandatory. The Refugee Act amended section 243(h) to
conform to Article 33.39 Section 243(h) now fully recognizes the
Convention's non-refoulement provision 0 The Refugee Act
further created a statutory procedure for granting refugees true
asylum status, even if such relief was within the Attorney General's
discretion.4 This procedure unproved the previous administrative
36. In Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1990), the court noted: "It
is at least as arbitrary and unjust for a government to persecute persons falsely accused of
being ideological enemies as it is for a government to persecute real ideological enemies."
This differs from the insincere attribution accepted in Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432
(9th Cir. 1987). The cynical imputation blurs the distinction between a personal dispute
and government persecution on account of political opinion. See Mark G. Artlip, Neutrality
as Poliucal Opinion: A New Asylum Standard for a Post-Elias-Zacarias World, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV 559, 584 (1994).
37. Protocol, supra note 5.
38. Id art. 1.1.
39. Pub. L No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified as amended in 8
U.S.C. §1253(h) (1994)).
40. The Supreme Court acknowledged that
[i]f one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,'
and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was
to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to. the Status of Refugees to which the United
States acceded m 1968."
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S."421, 436-37 (1987). See Deborah E. Anker, Determining
Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms
in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV L. & Soc. CHANGE 433,437
(1992); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE LJ.
39, 43 (1994); David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 91, 109 (MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. ed., 1982); Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum Adjudication Process. An
Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1, 22 (1993).
41. Amended INA § 208 now specifically covers asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). In
any fiscal year, no more than 10,000 asylees may adjust their status to that of a lawful
permanent resident. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1994).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 18:255
mechamsm.4 2
Prior to section 243(h)'s amendment, the U.S. Attorney
General could withhold the deportation of aliens within the Umted
States. 43 Courts interpreted the phrase "within the Umted States"
to apply only to aliens who actually entered the Umted States.!
Thus, under the statute, an alien paroled into the United States or
seeking admission at the border did not qualify for relief.45
Following its amendment, section 243(h) further protected aliens
by prohibiting the United States from returning an alien to any
place where he would be persecuted.46 The amendment deleted
the language "within the United States."
Prior to this amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Leng
May Ma v. Barber47 held that section 243(h) did not protect a
parolee' who, although physically m U.S. territory, was not
"within the United States. ' 49  Leng May Ma was an alien who,
42. For a discussion-of the asylum mechanism, see 2 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY
MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.01 (rev. ed. 1993); Martin, supra
note 40 at 109-10;'Vaughns, supra note 40, at 16-18.
43. The pre-1980 version read as follows: "The Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which m his
opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such penod of time as
he deems necessary for such reason." INA, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952).
44. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Although the alien was phvsically
present m the United States, she was not "within the United States" because of her parole
status. Id. at 186.
45. Id. The term "within the United States" referred to the alien's legal status, not his
location. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2561 (1993).
46. Congress intended to cover exclusion as well as deportation proceedings. The
House Report reflected that intent by indicating that the changes required "the Attorney
General to withhold deportation of aliens who qualify as refugees and who are m exclusion
as well as deportation proceedings." H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1979).
The Senate Report also indicated that section 243(h) required "the Attorney General to
withhold the deportation of aliens who seek asylum in exclusion, as well as deportation
proceedings." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1979), repnnted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 157. The Conference Report indicated that the revised statute was
based on the Protocol's language and should be construed consistently with the Protocol.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
141, 161.
47. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
48. A parolee is an alien whom the U.S. Attorney General has temporarily allowed
into the United States. This temporary status is not regarded as an admission of the alien.
INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994). "The parole of aliens seeking
admission is simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while
administrative proceedings are conducted." Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 190.
49. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 189-90. The Court relied on its previous decision in
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925), where it addressed-whether the parolee was "dwelling
in the United States" for purposes of the naturalization statute and whether the parolee
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although excludable, was paroled into the Umted States. Because
his parole status did not grant him legal entry, the Court con-
sidered him "outside the country."
The issue arose whether the alien was "within the Umted
States"50 because section 243(h) protected only aliens legally
within the United States. By omitting the language "within the
Umted States" from the Refugee Act, Congress extended protec-
tion to aliens legally outside the Umted States. Perhaps Congress
intended to include aliens subject to exclusion proceedings and any
non-admitted aliens who were m custody but not legally within the
Umted States."
Congress has specifically identified when physical presence is
,a prerequisite for a statutory remedy.52 Thus, if Congress intend-
ed to protect only those aliens physically present in, but not
admitted to, the Umted States, the Refugee Act would have
"entered or [was] found in the United States" for purposes of the statute of limitations on
deportation. The Court in Kaplan gave a parolee the same status as an alien who had been
stopped at the border. Id. at 230. In Leng May Ma, Justice Douglas dissented, expressing
his concern with the majority's characterization of a parolee's status: "How an alien can be
paroled 'into the United States' and yet not be 'within the United States' remains a
mystery." 357 U.S. at 192. He further noted that while the parolee in Kaplan sought to
enlarge "the prerogatives of a parolee," the parolee in Leng May Ma' sought to avoid
persecution. Id.
50. Although physically within the United States, an alien who is in custody pending
a determination of admissibility is not "within the United States." Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The alien's parole status does not grant him
admission to the United States; rather, he is "to be dealt with in the same manner as that
of any other applicant for admission to the United States." Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 188
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)).
51. In Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). the Supreme Court noted
that section 243(h) specifically restricts the U.S. Attorney General's power to act only
within the United States in deportation and exclusion proceedings. Thus, section 243(h)
did not apply to the President's action against aliens on the high seas. Id. at 2559-60.
Because Congress intended the Refugee Act to conform to the U.N. Protocol, section
243(h)(1) should affect the President's action. See Harold H. Koh, The Human Face of the
Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 486-87 (1993); Thomas D. Jones,
International Decisions, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 114, 123 (1994);.Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding
and Abetting Persecutors: The Seizure and Return of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the
U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 67,70 (1993).
52. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575-76 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The physical presence
requirement is mentioned throughout the INA. See INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(1994) (asylum procedure); § 209(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(B) (adjustment of status
of refugees); § 244(a)(i)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)-(2) (suspension of deportation);
§ 245A(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(A)(3)(A) (adjustment of status of certain entrants
before January 1, 1982); § 301(d), (e), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d), (e), (g) (nationals and
citizens of United States at birth); § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (children born out of
wedlock); § 360(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (application for certificate of identity).
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expressly inposed such a restnction 3  Section 243(h), however,
does not contain such a restnction. The Refugee Act provided a
procedure for overseas refugees and asylees "physically present m
the United States or at a land border or port of entry."' In
comparison, however, section 243(h) does not establish a re-
quirement beyond "any alien."'55 Curiously, Congress qualified
any alien subject to persecution for relief under section 243(h)
while simultaneously providing possible relief for aliens located
elsewhere.56
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, the U.S. Supreme Court
confronted the forced repatriation of Haitians and concluded that
the Refugee Act covers excludable and deportable aliens, both of
whom were presumed to be "within the United States.6 7  Thus,
the Court viewed Congress' omission of the language "within the
United States" as an attempt to broaden the scope of section
243(h) beyond deportation proceedings.
If Congress intended to limit the "withholding of deportation"
to aliens within the United States, it would not have deleted this
li-mtation when it amended the Refugee Act.5" Arguably, if the
word "return" in section 243(h) applies only to exclusion, deleting
the existing language was unnecessary.59 Perhaps the language
"within the United States" was redundant. If so, Congress should
be forgiven for another redundancy if, by inserting "return," it in-
53. See Harold H. Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35
HARV INT'L L.I. 1, 15 (1994).
54. Refugee Act, supra note 4, § 201(b), 94 Stat. at 105 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (1994)).
55. INA §.243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994); Brief for Respondent at 66, McNary v.
Haitian Centers Council -(decided sub. nora. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council), 113 S. Ct.
2549 (1993), (No. 92-344), reprinted in 35 HARV INT'L L.J. 21, 28 (1994).
56. See Koh, supra note 53, at 15.
57. 113 S. Ct. at 2562. Justice Blackmun noted m his dissent that "[t]o read into
§ 243(h)'s mandate a temtorial restriction is to restore the very language that Congress
removed." Id. at 2574. President Bush's Kennebunkport Order, issued in 1992, provided
that vessels be returned to the country of origin and did not obligate the United States to
return aliens outside its territory. See Exec. Order No. 12807, 57 Fed; Reg. 23,133 (1992).
58. If deportation relates only to aliens who actually enter the United States, then the
phrase "within the United States' belonged to both the pre-1980 and post-1980 versions
of section 243(h). The current version covers "withholding of deportation or return." INA
§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994). Thusi the statute merely added an alternative,
procedure to deportation.
59., The deletion of the language "within the United States" raises the question
whether only aliens involved in exclusion proceedings are not "within the United States."
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2575 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tended to apply the statute to all aliens.
If Congress wished to prevent the return of aliens to their
homelands, regardless of their location, it would not have included
the word "deport" m section 243(h). Having already addressed
deportation in the original statute, Congress broadened the scope
of the Refugee Act to cover aliens m other contexts.60 Inserting
the word "return" enabled Congress to apply the statute outside
the deportation context. Tius approach is also consistent with the
deletion of the reference to the alien's location.61
Clarifying this confusion depends upon the interpretation of
"return." Extratemtonal application of section 243(h) better
serves the legislation's humamtarian goals.62 Furthermore, by
avoiding the term "exclude," Congress may have intended that the
statute not apply only to the exclusion of aliens who face per-
secution abtoad.63 Perhaps Congress wanted to be faithful to the
60. When the United States was considering accession to the Protocol, a State
Department representative stated the following to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations:
Both the President and Secretary Rusk have pointed out that the prohibition
against the return of refugees to countries where they would face persecution is
of foremost importance among the Protocol's provisions. Refugees flee from
persecution and oppression. In most cases, the oppressive state exerts itself to
secure the return of these nationals whose flight and refusal to return serve as
first-hand testimony to the arbitrary and oppressive policies of the government of
their homeland.
Hearing on Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, S. EXEC. REP. No. 14 app., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (statement of Laurence
A. Dawson, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, U.S.
Department of State).
In 1968, INA § 243(h) applied only to deportation and Mr. Dawson did not refer to
the word "expel" in Article 33 of the Convention. It is unclear whether he was equating
the term "return" with the INA's "withholding of deportation."
61. See Thomas D. Jones, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 77, 114-15 (1993); Koh, supra note 53, at 15.
62. The Refugee Act was founded on "the historic policy of the United States to
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands." S. REP.
No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980). The Act withdrew the Attorney General's
discretion by making the provisions of § 243(h) mandatory. Four exceptions to the grant
of relief were consistent with the U.N. Convention. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1979). For a historical review of the Refugee Act, see Deborah E. Anker &
Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980,
19 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1 (1981); Martin, supra note 40, at 91.
63. INA § 236,8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1994) addresses exclusion proceedings and INA § 242,
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994) addresses deportation proceedings. ' Immigration judges have
exclusive jurisdiction over aliens who are in exclusion proceedings and aliens who have
been served with an order to show cause m deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. 208.2(b)
(1995). Neither the statute nor the regulations use the terms "exclude" and "return"
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Convention's language.64 Congress did not adopt the Conven-
tion's exact language, however, as demonstrated by its use of the
terms "deport or return" ratherthan the Convention's terms "expel
or return ('refouler')."'6 Its keenness in adopting the Conven-
tion's terminology ceased after it substituted "deport" for "expel."
Congress clearly expressed its intent regarding aliens already within
the United States. If the term "return" had a specific meaning
domestically, Congress should have assured clarity by substituting
the term "exclude" for "return., 66 ThI s substitution would have
clarified Congress' actions and intent.
If the restriction was necessary, Congress should not have been
reluctant to make both substitutions. One need only look at the
with the laniguage of other sections that states exclusion proceedings precede the alien's
deportation. For example, in exclusion proceedings, the judge must determine whether "an
arriving alien shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported." Id
§ 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
64. The Conference Reports on S. 643 indicate the reasoning behind the withholding
of deportation provision: "The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the
understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended
that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." H.R. CONF REP. No. 781,
96th Cong., 2d Sess 20 (1980); S. CONF REP. NO. 590, 96th Coni., 2d Sess 20 (1980).
65. Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.1. See also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, where
the Court did not stress the difference between "expel" m the Convention and "deport"
in the INA. 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2551 (1993). Rather, it viewed the term "return" as applying
to exclusibn proceedings. Id. Justice Blackmun in his dissent considered the plain
statutory meaning and noted that Congress's deletion of the language "within the United
States" suggests that the term "return" should be interpreted broadly. Id. at 2574-75.
Nonetheless, the Court reverted to legislative history to interpret this seemingly
unambiguous language. See Jones, supra note 61, at 114.
Despite the Court's opinion that the term. "return" under INA § 243(h) applied only
to exclusion proceedings, President Bush's Kennebunkport Order commanded th5 Coast
Guard to "return" Haitian vessels and passengers to Haiti. See Exec. Order No. 12807,
§ 2(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 303,304 (1992), reprnted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Because the Coast Guard
operation occurred on the high seas, the President's actions did not constitute exclusion
proceedings, and thus exceeded the scope of the Court's definition of "return." See
generally Koh, supra note 53, at 15.
66. "[T]he narrow concept of exclusion [does not] relate in any obvious way to the
amendment's broad phrase 'return any alien.'" Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The INA employs the term "return" in various contexts. For example, INA
§ 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)(C) (1994), states that an alien may be "returned" to custody
if he violates his bond; § 283, 8 U.S.C. § 1353, provides that employees are eligible for
certain expenses upon voluntary retirement and "return" to the United States; and
§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), relieves a permanent resident from exclusion if he is
"returning" to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven. years. If Congress intended to
subject the term "return" to different meanings, it would have specifically defined it in each
context.
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other statutory references to exclusion.67 INA section 212(a)
unambiguously identifies the grounds for exclusion." An alien at
a port of entry risks being excluded if he does not qualify for
admission.69
The problem arises if Congress intended the term "return" in
section 243(h) to cover exclusion only. Arguably, the change in
language suggests that Congress not only intended to prevent the
exclusion of aliens seeking admission at a port of entry7" but also
to protect them beyond the exclusion and deportation contexts. 71
The presumption against extraterritorial application helps the
Umted States avoid conflicts with foreign states.72 When inter-
67. Certain classes of aliens are ineligible to receive visas and are "excluded" from the
United States. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994). An alien who appears to an
immigration officer to be excludable shall be temporarily "excluded." Id. § 235(c), 8
U.S.C. § 1225(c). In exclusion proceedings, the judge determines whether he will allow an
alien who has been detained for further inquiry under INA § 235 to enter or be "excluded"
and deported. Id. § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
68. There are nine categories of excludable aliens. See supra note 19; INA § 212(a)(1)-
(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(9) (1994).
69. INA § 212(a)(1)-(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(1)-(9) (1994).
70. If the alien's life or freedom is threatened on one of the statutory grounds, INA
§ 243(h) prohibits the U.S. Attorney General from deporting an alien who is m deportation
proceedings. Section 243(h) also prohibits the "return" of an alien who is in exclusion
proceedings under certain circumstances. Otherwise, the alien shall be "excluded and
deported." INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994). Congress should have phrased the
statute to prohibit the U.S. Attorney General from deporting a deportable alien or from
excluding and deporting an excludable alien. The term "return" in § 243(h) lends itself to
various interpretations. In Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, the Court rejected the contention
that "return" referred solely to that destination where the alien was to be removed. 113
S. Ct. 2549,2560 (1993). The Court reasoned that the term "deport" would be redundant
if "return" prevented all aliens from being sent back to their oppressors. Id. Congress,
however, may have wanted to preserve the deportation reference while extending
protection to other aliens outside the deportation context. See Jones, supra note 61, at 114-
115.
71. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sale suggested this possibility. He considered the
deletion of the language "within the United States" from § 243(h) to be significant. 113
S. Ct. at 2574. The deletion of this language also affected § 243(h)'s extraterritorial
application. See Koh, supra note 53, at 15.
72. The presumption against extraterritorial application applies only when Congress
does not express its intent. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). It operates
to avoid potential international conflicts. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244,248 (1991). Congress should have considered the Refugee Act's implications because
it protected aliens who sought to avoid persecution. Nevertheless, the potential for embar-
rassment m the international context is far-fetched in the case of action on the high seas,
as with Haitian interdiction. See Sale, 113 S. at 2576-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Jones,
supra note 61, at 112. Applying U.S. law in international waters should not pose a problem
if that law does not conflict with that of any other state. See The Supreme Court, 1992
Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV L. REV. 352, 357 (1993).
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vention occurs on the high seas, rather than in a foreign jurisdic-
tion, a conflict is unlikely. A conflict may arise, however, when
another country-perhaps the persecuting country-objects to the
Umted States' refusal to return aliens who will face punishment.
Although Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns m
mind, it is questionable whether the protection of aliens serves only
such concerns. Because the statute's primary purpose is to protect
human rights, such protection should be available even on the high
seas.73 The statute prohibits rather than requires certain action,
thus it is easier to appreciate the legislative goal of ensuring that
the state is not in complicity with persecutors abroad.74
The statute's extraterrtonal effect should not be restricted. A
country should restrict the deportation or exclusion of aliens who
face danger at home, but also should be sensitive to the plight of
aliens on the high seas.' A country should not tolerate human
rights violations merely because they occur outside its jurisdiction.
Although Congress did not expressly address this issue, it intended
to conform section 243(h) to the Convention 6 and to the Umted
73. President Carter indicated the legislation's impact when he signed S. 643,mto law:
"The Refugee Act reflects our long tradition as a haven for people uprooted by
persecution and political turmoil. In recent years, the number of refugees has increased
greatly. Their suffering touches all and challenges us to help them, often under difficult
circumstances." Refugee Act of 1980; Statement on Signing S. 643 into Law, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 503 (March 18, 1980).
74. Reflecting on the breadth of section 243(h), Justice Scalia recalled: "The imperative
language of this provision is not an accident [Tlhe nondiscretionary duty imposed by
§ 243(h) parallels the Umted States' mandatory nonrefoulement obligations under Article
33.1 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees " INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 331 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. In Sale, the Court reasoned that the Coast Guard was not "returning" the Iaitians
within the meaning of § 243(h). 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (1993). President Bush s Ken-
nebunkport Order directed the Coast Guard to "return" Haitian vessels and their
passengers to Haiti. Exec. Order No. 12807, 3 C.F.R. 303-04 (1992). Yet INA § 243(h)
prohibits this type of conduct. If the Coast Guard was not enforcing the same section
243(h) through its interdiction activities on the high seas, then its actions must be viewed
as ultra vires. See Harold Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" m United States Human Rights
Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2415 (1994).
76. In INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992), Justice Scalia noted:
We presumed m Cardoza-Fonseca, however, that after 1968, when the United
States acceded to this provision of the Convention, the Attorney General
"honored Xhe dictates" of Article 33.1 m administering § 243(h). In 1980,
Congress removed all doubt concerning the matter by substituting the permissive
language of § 243(h), the current mandatory provision, basically conforming it to
the language of Article 33 [of the Convention].
Id. at 330 (Scalia, J., concurring m part and dissenting in part).
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States' international obligations.7 Thus, the notion that the
Umted States restricts the, deportation and exclusion of aliens who
face persecution, while returning aliens outside its jurisdiction to
face similar treatment, is inconsistent with congressional intent."
If the prohibition against returning aliens to face persecution
applied only to aliens within a country's jurisdiction, the terms
"return" and "exclude" would be synonymous.79 Additionally, a
country would have an incentive to intercept aliens on the high
seas to ensure they could not demand protection when they
reached a port of entry.8° Jurisdictional grounds should not
deprive an alien of an opportunity to present his persecution claim.
Congress withdrew the U.S. Attorney General's discretion and
deleted the language "within the United States" to afford
77. The extent of such obligations may be gleaned from conventional and customary
international law:
The binding obligations associated with the pnnciple of non-refoulement are
derived from conventional and customary international law. While the principle
may not necessarily entail asylum, admission, residence, or indeed any particular
solution, it does enjoin any action on the part of a state which returns or has the
effect of-returning refugees to territones where their lives or freedom may be
threatened.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
897, 902-03 (1986).
78. The United States based its authority to miterdict Haitian vessels on the high seas
on an agreement with Haiti. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981,
U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559. Whether such an agreement could be sanctioned under Article
33 of the Convention is questionable because it would allow the United States to agree
with persecuting nations to return aliens to their homeland as long as such aliens were
intercepted on the high seas.
79. In Sale, the Court gave a narrower meaning to the term "return." 113 S. Ct. at
2563. Nonetheless, President Bush's Kennebunkport Order authorized the Coast Guard
to "return" Haitians to Haiti. Exec. Order No. 12807, 3 C.F.R. 303-04 (1992). French
newspapers commented on the U.S. decision to return the refugees: "La d6cision du
prdsident Bush d'ordonner A la. garde. c6ti&re amencaine de refouler les boat-people
haitiens a suscit6 'Ia surprise et l'inquitude' du haut-commissaire des Nations unies
pour les rdfugids." [President Bush's decision to order the U.S. Coast Guard to return the
Haitian boat people surprised and troubled the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees]. See Jean-Michel Caroit, HaYt" en d6pit des mesures prises par les Etats-Unts,
l'exode continue [Haiti: Despite measures taken by the United States, the exodus continues],
LE MONDE (Pans), May 29, 1992, at 4. See also Koh, supra note 75, at 2414.
80. In Sale, Justice Blackmun's dissent reminded the Court that the Convention's
purpose is to protect fleeing refugees who could no longer look to their own governments.
113 S. Ct. 2549, 2577 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court's
construction of the treaty protected the United States' actions towards the Haitian refugees,
despite the fact that "such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33." Id. at 2565.
Although these refugees were merely seeking non-refoulement until the situation in Haiti
calmed down, the mass of Haitians who may reach U.S. shores may have concerned the
U.S. government. See Koh, supra note 75, at 2418.
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maximum protection to an alien threatened with persecution.!
It is unlikely that Congress intended to withdraw this protection for
aliens on the high seas. The extraterritonal application fully
recognizes an alien's status and makes section 243(h) consistent
with the United States' international obligations.
2. Article 33 of the Convention
After the United States acceded to the Protocol, the Refugee
Act appeared to solidify refugees' rights and reflect U.S. treaty
obligations.' The Protocol clarified any doubts about a specific
domestic provision.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, the U.S. Supreme Court
attempted to reconcile INA section 243(h) with Article 33.1 of the
Convention. The Convention provides that "[n]o contracting state
shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner what-
soever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened."'  Congress reflected the Convention's
terminology by using the language "deport. or return" in INA
secion 243(h).' The Court had to deternune whether the terms
"return" and "refouler" in Article 33.1 of the Convention differed
in meaning.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the government's interdiction
program on the high seas, noting that the Convention adopted a
narrow meaning of "return,"8 5 which the Convention's use of
"refouler" confirmed. The connotation was a "defensive act of
resistance," rather than merely returning an alien to a particular
place.86 During the 1951 United Nations Conference of
Plempotentianes, the Swiss delegate argued that the term
"refoulement" did not-apply to a refugee who had not yet entered
a country's territory.' The Netherlands delegate argued that
under this interpretation, his country owed no obligation to permit
81. The Court in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,430 (1987), adopted this clear probability
standard. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 19, at- 770-73.
82. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
83. Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.1.
84. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994), provides that "[t]he Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien."
85. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563-64 (1993).
86. Id. at 2563.
87. U.N. Conference of Plempotentlartes on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Summary Record of the 16th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 (1951) [hereinafter
Conference of Plenipotentiartes-16th meeting].
270 [Vol. 1.8:255
1996] The Immigration and Nationality Act 271
the mass influx migrations of aliens' and sought reassurance that
Article 33 did not prohibit states from preventing such incursions.
Unfortunately, the conference president placed the Netherlands
delegate's interpretation on record because no one challenged it.89
Although the interpretation needed clarification, the other
delegates' silence suggested concurrence with the president's ruling.
This passive reaction to the Netherlands delegate's
interpretation did not resolve the underlying issue. Although the
interpretation protected the states from a mass of refugees, it was
unclear whether it prevented the admission of aliens or enforced
the return of aliens within a country's borders.' The term "non-
refoulement" refers not to admission into a country but to a
country's obligation not to return refugees to any place that
threatens an alien's life or freedom.91 Convention delegates were
more concerned with refugees at their countries' borders than with
88. The'report of that meeting states as follows:
Baron van BOETZELAER (Netherlands) recalled that at the first reading the
Swiss representative had expressed the opinion that the word "expulsion" related
to a refugee already admitted into a country, whereas the word
"return"("refoulement") related to a refugee already within the territory but not
yet resident there. According to that interpretation, article 28 would not have
involved any obligations in the possible case of mass migrations across frontiers
or of attempted mass migrations.
U.N. Conference of Plempotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Summary Record of 35th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.2SR.35 (1951) [hereinafter
Conference of Plentpotentiares-35th meeting].
He reverted to that point because the Netherlands government attached great
importance to the scope of the provision now contained in Article 33. The Netherlands
could not accept any legal obligations regarding a mass of refugees seeking access to its
territory. Id.
89. See td. The difficulty lies in recognizing the difference between "agreeing" to or
"adopting" an interpretation and merely placing it on the record. Agreement or adoption
would be the normal course if an interpretation is binding. See, e.g., id. at 33-34 ("It
was agreed" to adopt Article 45 as the President interpreted it). See also Schoenholtz,
supra note 51, at 83.
90. The delegate's concern about large groups of refugees entering a country's
territory differed from the country's responsibility towards refugees who are beyond that
country's borders. The French delegate noted the possibility of returning a genuine
refugee: "[Alny possibility, even in exceptional circumstances, of a genuine
refugee being returned to his country of origin would not only be absolutely inhuman,
but was contrary to the very purpose of the Convention." Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, Summary Record of 40th mtg., 2d Sess. at 33, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.32/SR40 (1950).
91. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment, 6 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 103, 106 (1994); Schoenholtz, supra note 51, at 78 & n.40.
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promoting extraterritorial repatriations. 2 Perhaps they wished to
reaffirm that non-refoulement applies to individuals, not groups, in
order to avoid masses of people seeking admission. Although their
concern is legitimate, the fundamental notion remains that refugees
should not be returned to a dangerous environment.' Even if a
country denies an alien's plea for admission, returning an alien to
a country where his life or freedom would be threatened should
not be an alternative. There is a significant difference between
refusing admission at a country's borders and returning refugees on
the high seas to their persecutors.?4
Although the Convention does not specifically address the
admission of refugees,95 one may interpret Article 33 as preven-
ting the return of an alien who presents himself at a frontier to a
country of persecution.96 This interpretation is consistent with the
purpose of Article 33 and with the principle that a state need not
92. Conference of Plentporentiaries-35th meeting, supra note 88, at 21. THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION 1951;. at 331, 335 (Paul Weis ed. 1995).
93. When the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems Oiscussed the
issue that there was no obligation to admit refugees, the U.S. delegate noted:
It did not, however, follow that the convention would not apply to persons fleeing
from persecution who asked to enter the territory of the contracting parties,
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refugee who asked
admittance, or of turning hun back after he had crossed the frontier, or even of
expelling him after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the
problem was more or less ihe same. Whatever the case ught be, whether or not
the refugee was in a regular position, he must not be turned back to a country
where his life or freedom could be threatened. No consideration of public order
should be allowed to overrule that guarantee, for if the State concerned wished
to get nd of the refugee at all costs, it could send hin to another country or place
him in an internment camp.
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Summary Record of 20th mtg.
at 11-12, U.N. Doc. E/AC. 32/SR 20 (1950);
94. In Sale, the Court acknowledged that such action "may even violate the spirit of
Article 33." 113 S. Ct. 2549,2565 (1993). Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion
in Sale, previously dissented in United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). In
Alvarez-Macham, the Court held that a U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty had not been
violated when U.S. agents abducted a Mexican national in Mexico because the treaty was
silent regarding the obligations of the parties not to abduct persons from the other
country's territory. 504 U.S. at 666. Justice Stevens believed that interpreting the treaty's
silence as allowing the kidnapping made the treaty's provisions mere verbiage. Id. at 673
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court in Sale did exactly what Justice Stevens
found so disdainful in Alvarez-Macham. See Blackmun, supra note 40, at 44.
95. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1983);
THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 325, 327; Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, supra note 93, at 11.
96. See C.A. Pompe, The Convention of 28 July 1951 and the International Protection
of Refugees 19, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF/42 (1958); GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND
NON-REFOULEMENT 178 (1989).
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grant an alien asylum. Furthermore, the country of refuge may
remove the alien to another safe haven.' A country violates Ar-
ticle 33 only if it sends the alien to a country where he will be
persecuted."
A country's obligation to protect the alien from persecution is
even more compelling if mass immigration does not threaten its
borders. This may explain why the Convention delegates did not
encourage intercepting refugees at sea and returning them to their
homeland. Article 33 requires states to protect refugees unless
their protection compromises the sovereignty of contracting states.
Therefore,. a state should not force an alien into persecution if it
can temporarily accommodate him until alleviation of the
danger.99
In Haitian Centers Council, the agreement between Haiti and
the United States allowing for the interdiction of vessels on the
high seas must have bolstered the U.S. Supreme Court's confidence
in its own findings.1°°  If the Convention had no extratemtorial
application, tus agreement would be valid. 1 t Unfortunately, the
United States' position is inconsistent because it defended the
pnnciple of non-refoulement both dunring and after consideration of
the Refugee Act." Surprisingly, although the Haitian
97. See STENBERG, supra note 96, at 178; Pompe, supra note 96, at 20.
98. Even if the travaux preparatotres do not clearly answer whether Article 33 protects
only refugees in the territory of a state, it is instructive to contemplate the other possibility.
Paul Weis observed the coverage of Article 33 of the Convention:
It should be pointed out that if Article 33 read in conjunction with Article 31
is not taken to prohibit the return of refugees who present themselves at the
frontier, this would mean that the extent to which a refugee is protected-in
accordance with the humanitanan aims of the Convention-against return to a
country in which he fears persecution would depend upon the fortuitous
circumstance whether he has succeeded m penetrating the territory of a
Contracting State.
Paul Weis, Terntorial Asylum, 6 INDIAN J. INT'L L 173, 183-84 (1966) (footnote omitted).
99. See STENBERO, supra note 96, at 178.
100. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, supra note 78.
101. The Agreement reflected the "need for international cooperation regarding law
enforcement measures taken with respect to vessels on the high seas and the international
'obligations mandated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." Id. at 3559.
Furthermore, it was understood that the U.S. government did not intend "to return to Haiti
any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee
status." Id. at 3560. Because this action was to occur on the high seas, there was no
question of extraterritonality.
102. An example of this occurred on November 25,1974, when the U.S. Representative
on the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly made a comment on the Annual
Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):
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government was the alleged persecutor, the Court tolerated the
vessels' interdiction and the Haitians' return to Haiti. If the
interception had occurred within the United States,, no question
would arise regarding the Convention's proscription against
returning the aliens. The argument against extraterritorial
application of non-refoulement allowed Haiti and the United States
to deprive refugees of protection solely by virtue of their
location."t 3  Whether the Convention delegates intended to
provide such a delicate exception to the principle of non-
refoulement is questionable. This gap m coverage could pernut
states to skirt the strictures of the Convention by intercepting
refugees outside of their jurisdiction.
This type of interception is not a matter of inhibiting the
refugees' progress on the high seas, but of deliberately attempting
to intercept and return them to the place of danger. Article 33.1
does not addiess the refugee's location but merely prohibits the
refugee's return; other articles consider a refugee's location when
As the Committee knows Article 33 of the Convention contains an unequivocal
prohibition upon contracting states against the refoulement of refugees "in any
manner whatsoever" to terrtories where their life or freedom would be
threatened
My government joins with the High Commissioner in condemning the
inhumane practice of refoulement. The principle that .refugees must not be
repatriated against their will, and the right of a refugee to seek and secure asylum,
have become ever more firmly embedded in international law.
ARTHUR W RovINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1974, at ill (1975); see also Proposed Interdiction cf Haitian Flag'Vessels, 5 OP. OFF.
LEGAL COUNSEL 242, 248 (1981) (individuals claiming persecution must have opportunity
to substantiate claims); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme,
Summary Record of 415th mtg., 38th Sess. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 96/SR. 415 (1987). U.S.
delegate, Mr. Moore stated:
Considering that the most important element of a refugee's protection was .the
-obligation of non-refoulement, it was tragic that refugees had been forced to
return to their countries against their will and without assurances that they would
not face' persecution on their return, especially when such violations were
committed by, or with the concurrence of, States parties to international
instruments prohibiting such acts.
Id.
103. Article 33.1 does not refer to a refugee's location; however, other provisions in the
Convention make explicit reference. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 6, art. 2 (refugee's
duties to the country rn-which "he finds himself"); id. art. 4 (Contracting States shall accord
to refugees "within their territories "); id. art. 15 ("Contracting States shall accord to
refugees lawfully staying in their territory "); ud. art. 17 ("[t]he Contracting States shall
accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory "). Furthermore, the only
geographical limitation applicable to the definition of "refugee" is that the person be
outside the country of persecution. Id. art. 1(A)..
The Immigration and Nationality Act
it is relevant.'t 4 One Convention delegate referred to a refugee's
location when discussing the possibility of mass migrations. That
reference, however, dealt more with the delegate's fear of confron-
tmg large numbers of refugees than with the application of non-
refoulement1 O' Viewed in this light, the refugee's location does
not detract from the fundamental notion that a state should not
send back a refugee to a particular place.
Article 33.2 does not protect a refugee who is a "danger
to [his] community." Some argue, .therefore, that non-
refoulement does not apply to a refugee on the high seas because
such a refugee is not in a "community."'" This argument,
however, takes for granted Article 33.2's inclusion of all refugees
to whom non-refoulement applies. In addition, Congress would not
have referred specifically to undesirable refugees unless Article
33.2 covered them. The goals of the Convention are prohibiting
the return of refugees against their will while protecting the state
from certain undesirable aliens seeking to enter its territory.107
The draftsmen may have found it expedient to restrict the
exception to refugees on the igh seas who do not pose an
immediate threat to any territory. Thus, security for refugees on
the high seas would be unnecessary because such refugees are not
in any "commumty"' ° and no need exists to resort to emergency
104. Article 32 prohibits Contracting States from expelling a refugee "lawfully in their
territory" except on the basis of national security or public order. Id. art. 32. Article 33.1
forbids a Contracting State to "expel or return" a refugee in "any manner whatsoever."
Id. art. 33.1. In both articles, the term "expel" should have the same meaning in referring
to refugees lawfully within the country of refuge.
105. See U.N. Conference of Plenzpotenuanes-35th'meeting, supra note 88, at 21; THE
REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 331; Schoenholtz, supra note 51, at 83-84.
106. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
107. Under Article 1(F) of the Convention, a person who has committed a serious, non-
political crime outside the country of refuge, is not a "refugee." Therefore; Article 33.2's
territorial limitation only covers events arising subsequent to the alien's arrival in the
country of refuge. The Convention delegates were concerned with the alien's threat to the
community or to national security following the alien's adrmssion to status. In any event,
the delegates intended that Article 33.2 protect states against those aliens convicted of
"particularly serious crimes." .THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 336.
108. Article 33.2 covers aliens who are really- a subset of those covered under Article
33.1. The former are already within the country -of refuge, whereas the latter are both
inside and outside the country of refuge. Article 33.1 requires contracting parties to
protect refugees regardless of their location. Article 33.2 exceptions apply only to refugees
who pose a threat to the country of refuge. See Schoenholtz,'supra note 51, at 79; TIIE
REFUGEE.CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 336.
The French representative at the Conference of Plempotentianes noted that while the
right of asylum was sacred, people should not be allowed to abuse it. The French and
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strategies. Not surprisingly, the draftsmen wanted to apply the
doctrine of non-refoulement while still protecting against un-
desirable elements. An alien who has not entered a temtory, and
who may never do so, does not pose an immediate threat to the
community.
Article 33's "expel or return (refouler)" language deserves
attention. Similar language in the 1933 Convention Relating to the
International Status of Refugees (1933 Convention) required states
to refrain from the "application of police measures, such as
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement)."' 9 In
the classic case, expulsions apply to refugees who are lawfully
within a nation's terrtory. Article 32 of the 1951 Convention
confirms this application by providing various procedural re-
quirements before a state may expel a refugee.1 This leaves us
to consider the context in which a state should not return an alien
to face persecution.
If one defines "refouler" as rejection at the border, the "expel
or return" language is easier to reconcile. The term "refoulement"
originated in Belgium and France."' It concerned rejection of
-aliens at the border and police action against non-resident aliens
within a state.112  Although many delegates at the Conference of
United Kingdom delegations submitted their amendment to enable States to pursue that
right by puishing activities that threatened national security or endangered the community.
U.N. Conference of Plentpotenttares-6th meeting, supra note 87, at 7.
109. Article 3 of the 1933 Convention provides as follows:
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its
territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance
at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there
regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national secunrty or
public order.
It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of
their countries of origin.
It reserves the right to apply such internal measures as it may deem necessary
to refugees who, having been expelled for reasons of national security or public
order, are unable to leave its territory because they have not received, at their
request or through the intervention of institutions dealing with them, the
necessary authonsations and visas permitting them to proceed to another country.
159 L.N.T.S. 205 (1933) (official text in French and translated by the Secretariat of League
of Nations).
110, Article 32 of the Convention provides that "[tihe Contracting States shall not expel
a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order."
Convention, supra note 6, art. 32.
111. See GOODWIN-GILLcsupra note 95, at 69; Pompe, supra note 96, at 19; STENBERG,
supra note 96, at 200.
112. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 69; Pompe, supra note 96, at 19; STENBERG,
supra note 96, at 200.
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Plempotentianes found this principle strange, delegates accepted it
in the final draft of the Convention.lm  It was unwise to include
both "refouler" and "return" in Article 33. In Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, the Court interpreted the scheme as restricting
"return" to a narrow legal meamng,"4 citing to authoritative
French dictionaries that omitted "return" from the definition .of
"refouler ''115 Nevertheless, President Bush's Kennebunkport
Order' 6 authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to "return" the fleeing
aliens to Haiti. By "returning" the Haitians, the Umted States
violated the Convention's prohibitions."7
The 1951 Convention delegates might have considered a
dictionary's definition more seriously had they anticipated it would
play such a significant role in interpreting Article 33. The
delegates were unaware of the problems that would arise m
reconciling "return" with "refouler" The inability to find a
resolution in the dictionaries frustrated the U.S. Supreme Court in
Sale, and the Court was reluctant to accept the ordinary meaning
of the terms. Although the Court was unable to reconcile the two
terms,118 it eventually defined "return" as a "defensive act of
resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of transpor-
113. The United Kingdom delegate concluded as follows:
[T]he notion of "refoulement" could apply to (a) refugees seeking admission, (b)
refugees illegally present in a country, and (c) refugees admitted temporarily or
conditionally. Refemng to the practice followed in his own country, [the
delegate] stated that refugees who had been allowed to enter the United Kingdom
could be sent out of the country only by expulsion or deportation. There was no
concept in these cases corresponding to that of "refoulement."
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Summary Record of 21st mtg.
at 5, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 (1950). -
114. 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563-64 (1993).
115. Id. at 2564.
116. Exec. Order No. 12807, § 2(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 303, 304 (1992), reprnted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1'182. The Executive Order also gave the U.S. Attorney General discretion to prohibit
the return of a refugee without his consent. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reqtures that treaties be
construed according to their ordinary meaning, the Court in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council
appears to have intentionally ignored the Convention's objective and purpose. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 29, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Justice
Stevens admitted that the actions of the United States "may even violate the spirit of
Article 33," but nonetheless construed Article 33 inconsistently with the treaty's objective
and purpose. 113 S. Ct. at 2565. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties also
regards a treaty's negotiating history as an aid of last resort. Nevertheless, the Court
emphasized the delegates' comments not adopted by the Conference. See id. at 2565-66.
118. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2564.
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ting someone to a particular destination." '1t9 This definition did
not conflict with the Convention delegates' intent because they did
not oppose a country's "resistance" or "rejection" of a refugee at
the border."° The delegates did oppose, however, the refugee's
return to the environment from which the refugee fled; thus, the
problem arose once a particular country was not disposed to offer
admission. Therefore, a link exists between the word "return" and
the language "to the frontiers of temtories where [the refugee's]
life or freedom would be threatened.'' The relationship be-
tween both parts of Article 33 is essential to the provision's proper
interpretation.
A traditional interpretation of the term "return" would
prohibit a state from sending a threatened refugee back to a
country from which he fled, but would permit it to send a refugee
to a country where he had never been because it would not be
"returning" the refugee in the literal sense of that term. Article 33,
however, prevents a state from sending the refugee back to the
danger from which he fled or to any other country which poses a
threat.'2 Thus, the provision's defimtion of "return" is
understandable because it does not seek to protect the refugee
from any particular country but rather from the perilous cir-
cumstances that precipitated his flight.
During the Convention's drafting stage, the.French delegate
explained that in France and Belgium, refoulement meant "either
deportation as a police measure or non-admittance at the fron-
tier." 23 This explanation assuaged the British delegate, who
concluded that refoulement affected refugees seeking adns-
sion.124 This interpretation of the term during the Convention's
119. Id.
120. The Court in Sale'limited itself to the English translations supported by. the two
dictionaries consulted. Id.
121. As Professor Goodwin-Gill observed, "[NIon-refoulement is not so much about
admission to a State, as about not returning refugees to where their lives or freedom may
be endangered." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 106. Furthermore, non-refoulement
prohibits the return of refugees "in any manner whatsoever" to countries where they may
face persecution. Therefore, Article 33 regulates state action, whether it occurs "internally,
at the border, or through its agents outside territorial jurisdiction." Id. at 105.
122. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564 n.39; NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION 161
(1953).
123. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, supra note 113, at 4-5.
124. Id. at 5.
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drafting stages is consistent with contemporary usage. One report
of the Haitian interdiction commented on the refoulement of
refugees heading to the Umted States." 5 Apparently, the report-
ers of this -episode did not compare the terminology of Article 33
with their projected usage of the language in their articles. That
the terminology tracked the Convention's approach would be a
remarkable coincidence if refoulement was not intended to apply
to interdiction on the high seas.
The distinction between expulsion and return (refoulement) is
more apparent if one views Article 33 as imposmig two restrictions
on the treatment of refugees. The expulsion restriction prohibits
the removal of an alien from a contracting state, 6 whereas the
"return" restriction prohibits the return of an alien at or outside
the border .back to the place of danger. 27 Because expulsion can
only occur if a refugee is within a country's borders, the draftsmen
were concerned that a state rmght return a refugee to. a country of
persecution, even if the refugee was never within the state's
borders.
If Article 33 mandated that no state should expel and return
(refpuler) a refugee to a place of persecution, then an
interpretation that restricted the principle of non-refoulement to
refugees within the borders of a contracting state would be
justified. Such an interpretation would require the state's action to
originate from within and only prohibit the return of a refugee who
had first been expelled.12 The present formulation, however,
125. See Sale v. Haitan Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2569 (1993) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting) (quoting Le bourbier hattien, LE MONDE (Pans), June 1, 1992).
126. Both Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention use the term "expel." Article 32 directs
Contracting States not to "expel a refugee lawfully in their terrtory." Id. Article 33
provides that no Contracting State shall "expel a refugee in any manner whatsoever."
Id. Therefore, neither article's prohibition on expulsion leaves any ambiguity as to the
refugee's status and location.
127. Aside from refugees lawfully within a territory (Article 32), other refugees may be
categorized as unlawfully within or outside a state's territory. Refoulement is directed to
the latter category. Professor Goodwin-Gill defines it as "summary reconduction to the
frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally and summary refusal of admission of
those without valid papers." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 69 (footnote omitted). See
also Pompe, supra note 96, at 20.
128. The INA proceedings require that an alien be allowed entry before being
"excluded and deported." INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994). Deportation is the
physical act following the exclusion decision. If Article 33 imposed a similar limitation on
the term "return," excluding action on the high seas may be justified because the alien's
"return" would result from.the alien's expulsion.
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prevents a state from expelling or returning a refugee, suggesting
that non-refoulement differs from expulsion. In light of the
Convention's purpose to provide fundamental protection to
refugees wholly apart from the grant of asylum,'29 one should
interpret Article 33 according to its plain meaning, which grants
aliens protection upon meeting refugee status. Recognizing this
status before protecting the refugee is unnecessary 30  Therefore,
expulsion is not the only reason for the application of Article 33.
Similarly, Article 33's prohibition against expulsion or return
"in any manner whatsoever" suggests that the draftsmen intended
to accord refugees full protection.13 1 Those favoring a narrow
interpretation would argue that this phrase merely refers to the
physical means of removing the refugee, and that the prohibition
still would not apply to a refugee on the high seas. A more liberal
interpretation, however, would suggest that the draftsmen's
ultimate objective was to grant refugees "the widest possible
exercise of fundamental nghts and freedoms," and to ensure
that states do not interfere -with this objective.'32- The scope of
this provision is certainly broad enough to protect a refugee
regardless of his location or the state's disposition and to prevent
two contracting states from agreeing to return refugees to face
persecution. If states avoid the mandate of Article 33 by arguing
that the refugees are outside their borders, they dilute the meamng
of "return in any manner whatsoever."'1' The draftsmen
129. See Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at
7, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) (as Amicus Curiae in
support of Respondents), reprinted in 6 INT'L J. REF. L. 85, 92 (1994) [hereinafter Brief of
UNHCR]; GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 109; Koh, supra note 75, at 2416-17.
130. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 73; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAITIAN
INTERDICTION AGREEMENT 56 (1990); OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS para. 28 (1988) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
131. One could restrictively construe the language "in any manner whatsoever" to
exempt any return of refugees that did not include removal from a Contracting State's
territory. See Brief of UNHCR, supra note 129, at 7, reprinted in 6 INT'L J. REF L. 85, 91
(1994). Others have suggested that "so far as the words 'in any manner whatsoever' are
regarded a textual analysis does not exclude even measures of extradition from the
purview of Article-33." STENBERG, supra note 96, at 201; THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,
supra note 92, at 342.
132. See Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
133. The liberal interpretation of this language covers situations where a state sends a
refugee to a place where he is not threatened, knowing that another state eventually will
return the refugee to the persecuting state.
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intended to broaden, not restrict, the refugees' protection.
Denying such protection to aliens, on' the high seas is inconsistent
with the Convention's mandate that states not return refugees to
a hostile environment.
The draftsmen must have intended that the phrase "in any
manner whatsoever" serve a specific purpose. Perhaps m using
such broad language, they wanted to prevent the return of refugees
to the country of persecution, even if an uncontemplated
procedural oversight arises. Regardless of the draftsmen's
motivation m using such broad language, there is no evidence that
they wanted to ignore those refugees outside the offending state's
temtory.
III. PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIMES AND DANGER TO THE
COMMUNITY
A. Nature of INA § 243(h)(2)(B)
Section 243(h)(2)(B) of the INA demes relief to an alien if the
U.S. Attorney General determines that "the alien, having been
convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of the United States."",M The issue arises whether
authorities should base deportation solely upon an alien's convic-
tion without a separate finding of the alien's danger to the
commumty.
In In re Frentescu,35 the BIA provided guidance regarding
which crimes are particularly serious. Although some crimes are
inherently "particularly serious," others require an assessment of
several factors. The BIA suggested that important considerations
include "the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and
underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed,
and whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate
that the alien will be a danger to the commumty." '36 Congress
included the phrase "danger to the community" as an aid in
determining the seriousness of the crime.37 In Frentescu, the
BIA suggested that this element of dangerousness is only one of
several factors that a court should consider m determining whether
134. INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994).
135. 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (1982).
136. Md at 247.
137. Id. See also In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1986).
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a crime is "particularly serious.' 138
The BIA's formulation in Frentescu properly mvited a
consideration of the alien's relationship with the community. Such
a consideration was necessary to determine whether the alien had
committed a particularly serious crime and not merely whether the
alien was a danger to others.139 The BIA looked at the "totality
of the circumstances" in determimng the seriousness of the alien's
crime.
140
In In re Carballe,"4' however, the BIA indicated that the
element of dangerousness is an "essential key" and not merely one
of several factors in determining whether the alien committed a
particularly serious crime. 4 ' Perhaps the BIA was emphasizing
that the alien must be a danger to the community if he has
committed a particularly serious crime. The BIA confirmed this
interpretation, noting that "[i]f it is determined that the crime was
a 'particularly serious' one, the question of whether the alien is a
danger to the commumty of the United States is answered in the
affirmative."'43 The phrase "danger to the commurity" explains
only the effect of the alien's conviction and does not require two
separate findings for withholding deportation
144
In In re Carballe, the BIA focused on the nature of the crime
in determining the alien's dangerousness. 45 Arguably, however,
an assessment of the crime is relevant only for determuning
/ whether a person falls within the statutory category. Once
authorities have identified an alien as having previously committed
a crme, courts must determine whether the alien currently
constitutes a danger to the community under section
243(h)(2)(B) 46
138. See 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247.
139. If the BIA was concerned only with an alien's danger to others, it would not have
conceded that a crime against property may sometimes be considered a particularly serious
crime. See id.
140. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (1982).
141. 19 1. & N. 357, 357 (1986).
142. Id. at 360.
143. Id.
144. 1d (citing Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986); Zardui-
Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir. 1985) (Vance, J., concumng)).
145. Id
146. In Carbale, the BIA noted that neither it nor the courts should determine whether
an alien will be a recidivist. 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (1986). The BIA would have to
make such a determination, however, if dangerousness is relevant to defining the term
"particularly serious crime.'" Il The BIA must make this judgment either when
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1996] The Immigration and Nationality Act 283
Because the statute requires courts to determine the alien's
dangerousness at the time of the alien's application for relief, 47
courts should not make an automatic decision about the alien's
eligibility for relief when the conviction occurred in the distant
past. A finding regarding the crime's seriousness does not answer
whether the alien presently constitutes a danger to the community.
The U.S. Attorney General should first determine that the alien
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime before
concluding that the alien constitutes a danger to the com-
munity.t 8 The phrase "convicted of a particularly serious
crime" should only define those aliens to whom the U.S. Attorney
General applies her judgment. Section 243(h)(2)(B) does not apply
to an alien who is a danger to the commumty but who has not
been convicted of any crime. 4 9
The reference to dangerousness is unnecessary if Congress
merely intended to impose a permanent ban on the type of
criminals identified m the statute. Thus, the fact that Congress
determining whether the alien committed a "particularly serious crime," or when fulfilling
the dual finding requirement. lI&
147. According to the statute, relief is unavailable if the convicted alien "constitutes a
danger to the community of the United States." INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994) (emphasis added). In In re K, Int. Dec. No. 3163, at 1 (BIA 1991),
the BIA rejected the immigration judge's view that a convicted felon would not always be
a danger to the community and, thus, should not be forever barred. Id. at 7-8. •
148. In Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553,555-56 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993), the court did not
accept this argument because the Attorney General is required in every case to deternmne
whether an alien has been convicted and whether the conviction 4s final. This is implicit
in the statutory language because the U.S. Attorney General could not be expected to
make a determination about an alien who has not been convicted.
149. In Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987), the court agreed
that the provision in § 243(h)(2)(B) dealing with an alien's conviction modifies the word
"alien," thus limiting the category of dangerous aliens to convicted aliens. Nonetheless, the
court found that Congress could have, required a dual finding of conviction and
dangerousness by simply inserting "and" between the clauses. Id. Limiting the category
to convicted aliens does not necessarily resolve the issue regarding the dual finding.
requirement.
The court in Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 1993), found "consider-
able logical force" in the alien's argument in favor of separate determinations. In Martins
v. INS, 972 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992), the alien believed that congressional intent supported
his position. The Fifth Circuit relied on the House Judiciary Committee Report in
clarifying the issue, noting that the "Report clearly states that the act intended to make
those aliens, 'who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime which makes them
a danger to the community', ineligible for a withholding of deportation." Id. at 661 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979)). A fair reading of this language
suggests that the disqualifying feature is whether the crime renders an alien dangerous, thus
narrowing the breadth of particularly serious crimes.
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included the additional language suggests that the statute requires
separate findings of the seriousness of the crime and of the alien's
danger to the commumty. The argument that the alien's conviction
for a particularly serious crime is sufficient-without a finding of
the alien's present danger-presents an unexplained redundancy
that Congress would be inclined to avoid.
When Congress amended section 243(h) m 1980,150 the
House Judiciary Committee Report noted that a statutory
exception exists for "aliens who have been convicted of par-
ticularly serious crimes which make them a danger to the com-
munity of the Umted States." '' The Report's language suggests
that not all "particularly serious crimes" would deny an alien relief,
but only those that rendered an alien dangerous to the com-
mumty.52  If the Report' orly referred to "particularly serious
crimes," a mere finding of a conviction would suffice. Additionally,
Congress would find it unnecessary to qualify the types of crimes
falling within the exception if "particularly serious crimes" were
equivalent to the alien constituting a danger to the community.5 3
Congress did not clarify this issue when it enacted the
Immigration Act of 1990. In amending section 243(h)(2) to include
an aggravated felony as a particularly serious crime," 4 Congress
did not resolve the basic question concerning the alien's dangerous-
ness. Despite challenges to its interpretation, by 1990 courts had
construed section 243(h)(2)(B) as barring relief to aliens convicted
of particularly serious crimes without requiring further findings.55
150. Refugee Act, supra note 4, at § 203(e), 94 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994)).
151. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
152. In AI-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995), the court cited with approval the
House Judiciary Committee Report without discussing its actual language. As did the Fifth
Circuit in Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit automatically
denied relief to an alien who had been.convi&ed of a particularly serious crime, relying on
the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980. Al-Saleh, 47 F.3d at 394-96.
153. A statute should be construed in a manner that does not render any part of it
meaningless and redundant. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 928 F.2d 1378, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758
F.2d 741, 758 (1st Cir. 1985); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992).
154. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,-§ 515(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5053
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) 1994)) [hereinafter Immigration Act of
19901.
155. See Arauz v. Rivkmd, 845 F.2d 271,275 (11th Cir. 1988); Ramirez-Ramos v. INS,
814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Congress' reluctance to amend the language of section
243(h)(2)(B) would be less problematic if, m the same section of
the Immigration Act of 1990, it had not demed asylum relief to a
person convicted of an aggravated felony.156 Congress failed to
provide a similar bar to withholding of deportation proceedings for
such persons. As a result, the asylum provision now contains an
absolute bar to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, whereas the
withholding provision is open to interpretation.
In Garcia v. INS,'5 7 the Seventh Circuit accepted the BIA's
explanation in In re K that Congress did not wish to disturb the
structure of section 243(h) by tampering with the language of
subsection (2)(B).' The BIA has consistently interpreted
section 243(h)(2)(B) as not requiring a separate finding of
dangerousness.'59 In In re K," the BIA recognized Congress'
desire to include aggravated felomes as particularly serious crimes
and, thus, to exclude such felons from withholding of deportation.
It is questionable, however, whether Congress merely clarified the
existing ban on eligibility in section 243(h)(2)(B) or added "a
wholly independent bar based on conviction for an aggravated
felony."
61
Although the Garcia court noted congressional strictness
against criminals, Congress allowed an aggravated felon to avoid
deportation16 if he could show that. he posed no threat to others
pending a resolution of his exclusion or deportation problems. to
Given the gravity of the situation envisaged in section
243(h)(2)(B), Congress may not have wished to return serious
criminals to face persecution unless they threatened the com-
munity."c In that event, the categorization of aggravated felons
156. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 154, § 515(a)(1) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994)).
157. 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993).
158. Id. at 1322-23 (citing In re K, Int. Dec. No. 3163 (BIA 1991)).
159. In re U-M, Int. Dec. No. 3152,5 (BIA 1991); In re Gonzalez, 19 i. & N. Dec. 682
(BIA 1988); In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (1986).
160. Int. Dec. No. 3163, 1, 8-9 (BIA 1991).
161. See ud at 10. Congress left the issue unresolved in its 1990 amendment when it
included aggravated felons within the statutory. category of criminals.
162. Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990)) (releasing an alien who has committed an aggravated felony but is not a
danger to others).
163. See id.
164. The U.S. Attorney General has no discretion to deny relief to an alien who meets
the "clear probability" standard enunciated m INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This
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as aliens who have committed particularly serious crimes would be
consistent with a grant of relief
B. Aggravated Felonies in the INA
Some allege that imposing a two-step process would lead to
extensive hearings involving psychological findings and expert
testimony.165 Under subsection (2)(B), the alien's conviction
guides the U.S. Attorney General's determination of an alien's
danger to the community; under subsection (2)(D), however, the
U.S. Attorney General must rely on reasonableness to determine
an alien's threat to security.166  The U.S. Attorney General's
determination under either provision would not cause any problem
in the final analysis, regardless of whether it is based on a
conviction or on reasonableness.
If a conviction triggers an automatic finding of dangerousness
under section 243(h)(2)(B), the U.S. Attorney General should
explain the release of an alien who shows that he does not
represent a threat to the community during deportation.1 67
Courts should not treat an aggravated felony differently, under the
deportation provision if the crime constitutes a particularly serious
crime under section 243(h)(2)(B).'" Consequently, under the
deportation section, an aggravated felony conviction should not
prevent the alien from showing that he does not represent a threat
to the community. -
The statute accords similar deference to the U.S. Attorney
standard is higher than the well-founded fear of persecution set out in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
165. Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 65.7, 661 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Zardui-Quintana v.
Richards, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1985) (Vance, J., concurring)).
166. Subsection (2)(B) requires the Attorney General to deny relief if "the alien, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
the community of the United States." INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)
(1994). Subsection (2)(D) requires- the Attorney General to deny relief if "there are
reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United
States." Id. § 243(h)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D). It is equally difficult to determine
dangerousness in subsections (2)(B) and (2)(D).
167. Section 242(a)(2)(B) provides: "The Attorney General may not release from
custody any lawfully admitted alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, either
before or after a determination of deportability, unless the alien demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that such alien is not a threat to the community
Id. § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
168. The Immigration Act of 1990 recognized an alien who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony as an alien who has committed a particularly serious crime. See supra
note 154, § 515(a)(2) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1994)).
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General in the exclusion context. Section 236(e)(3)(C) allows the
U.S. Attorney General to release an alien felon if the alien does
not represent a "danger to the safety of other persons or to proper-
ty."' 69  Although this language differs slightly from section
243(h)(2)(B), both sections address the alien's danger to others70
and invite the U.S. Attorney General to make the necessary
judgment in light of the alien's questionable background.
Interestingly, section 236(e)(3)(C) parallels section 243
(h)(2)(B). Under section 236(e)(3)(C), if the U.S. Attorney
General wants to send an alien back to a country that does not
want to accept him, the U.S. Attorney General-must hold that alien
in custody unless the alien meets certain requirements. One
requirement is that the alien felon will not constitute a danger to
the safety of others. The U.S. Attorney General must find that the
alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony and is not
dangerous.' Thus, section 236(e)(3)(C) provides an exception
to the requirement that the U.S. Attorney General hold the alien
felon in custody if he is unable to return the alien to the alien's
homeland. 72 Similarly, under section 243(h)(2)(B), if the U.S.
Attorney General is unable to return the alien because the alien's
life or freedom would be threatened, the alien should remain if
previously convicted of an aggravated felony (and thus of a
particularly serious crime) and the alien does not represent a
danger to the community.
Both the courts 73 and the BIA 74 have held that aliens
convicted of particularly serious crimes constitute a danger to the
169. INA § 236(e)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3)(C) (1994).
170. Section 243(h)(2)(B) states "danger to the community," whereas section
236(e)(3)(c) states "danger to' the safety of other persons or to property." Id.
§§ 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B); 236(e)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3)(C).
171. Section 236(e) refers only to "any alien convicted of an aggravated felony." INA
§ 236(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(1) (1994). The U.S. Attorney General's determination
concerns "such alien." It § 236(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3).
172. Section 236(e)(2) allows the U.S. Attorney' General to release the excludable alien
if the alien's country will not accept him. INA § 236(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(2) (1994).
The U.S. Attorney General must first determine, however, that the alien will not pose a
danger to the safety of others or to property. I& § 236(e)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3)(C).
173. See AI-Salehl v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320 (7th
Cir. 1993); Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 1993); Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1992); Arauz v. Rivkmd, 845 F.2d 271 (11th Cir. 1988); Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
174. See In re U-M, Int. Dec. No. 3152 (BIA 1991); In re K, Int. Dec. No. 3163 (BIA
1991); In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1986).
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commumty. If this conclusion is valid, it must apply under all INA
provisions. Congress has permitted an alien to show that he is not
dangerous, thus indicating that an aggravated felony conviction
does not foreclose consideration of the alien's dangerousness;
Although Congress has allowed an alien to show that he is not a
threat, it strongly opposes aliens convicted of aggravated
felomes." Congress has not mandated, however, that such aliens
should always be treated similarly.76
Evidently, Congress does not consider an aggravated felon per
se dangerous.'77 Tins issue deserves consideration despite the
courts' scant attention to it.' 78 If an aggravated felony is a
particularly serious crime rendering the alien dangerous, relief
should not be available in other statutory contexts on the ground
that he is not dangerous. Congress, however, has provided an
avenue for relief, in effect suggesting that not all aggravated felons
are dangerous.
The Immigration Act of 1990 introduced a clear prohibition
against granting asylum to an alien convicted of an aggravated
175. Congress streamlined procedures for the deportation of aggravated felons in INA
§ 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1994) (mandatory detention of aliens convicted of
aggravated felony); td. § 242(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(3)(A) (24-hour availability of
INS resources to determine whether individuals arrested for aggravated felonies are aliens);.
ud § 242(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (expedited procedures for deportation of aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies).
176. The Immigration Act of 1990 denied exclusion relief to a returning lawful resident
who was convicted of an aggravated felony and served a term of at least five years
imprisonment. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 154 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(c) (1994)). Therefore, a mere conviction was insufficient to deny relief. Despite
the congressional toughness against aliens with aggravated felony convictions, Congress has
not precluded other considerations. See, e.g., INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)
(1994) (alien felon may be released from custody if he can convince the Attorney General
-that he is not a threat to the community). i
177. The asylum provision does not mention dangerousness: "An alien who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony may not apply for or be granted asylum." INA
§ 208(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994). A mere conviction precludes an alien from
consideration for relief. INA § 236(e) allows the U.S. Attorney General to release an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony pending a determination of excludability if the alien will
not pose a danger to others. l § 236(e)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3)(C). Under sections
243(h)(2)(B) and 208(d), an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically
deemed dangerous; yet section 236(e)(3)(C) requires the U.S. Attorney General to
determine an aggravated felon's dangerousness.
178. For example, in Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that Congress knew how to condition relief on an alien's dangerous-
ness. The court did not attempt to reconcile the automatic finding of dangerousness in
section 243(h)(2)(B) with the alien's ability to show lack of dangerousness in other INA
sections.
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felony"1 9 but merely clarified that such a felony is a "particularly
serious crime" for withholding of deportation.' s° In In re K,"1
the BIA did not view the 1990 Act as requirng a separate finding
of dangerousness because the Act left section 243(h)(2)(B)
otherwise intact. In In re Carballe,1" the BIA indicated that the
focus should be on the serious nature of the crime rather than the
probability of future misconduct. The strong congressional stance
against serious crimes seems consistent with the BIA's approach.
Nevertheless, Congress did not automatically reject leniency for all
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. For example, an- alien
felon is completely barred from a waiver of exclusion only if the
alien has served at least five years of umpnsonment.1' 3 Congress
would not have imposed this imprisonment requirement if it
intended to deny relief for a mere felony conviction. This waiver
provision grants relief to returning lawful residents who are other-
wise excludable.
An alien felon may attempt to convince the U.S. Attorney
General to exercise discretion in his favor under section 212(c).
Congress may have had a similar idea in enacting section 243(h)
when a clear probability of persecution exists upon the alien's
return to a certain country.1 4 Both sections 212(c) and 243(h)
impose additional requirements beyond mere conviction before a
court may deny an alien relief.s Thus, the congressional will to
tighten immigration procedures against cnrimnals did not disqualify
aggravated felons from consideration in all cases.
If Congress retained remedies for such aliens, the concern is
more compelling for those aliens who may face death upon their
return.186  The matter involves making an informed judgment
179. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 154, § 515(a)(1) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994)).
180. Id. § 515(a)(2) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1994)).
181. Int. Dec. No. 3163 (BIA 1991).
182. 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 359 (BIA 1986).
183. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
184. In the withholding of deportation context, even greater pressure exists when the
alien proves that he will be persecuted. Under section 212(c), however, no problem of
persecution arises. Id § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
185. Section 212(c) requires at least a five-year term of imprisonment, whereas section
243(h) requires a determination of the alien's dangerousness.
186. Congress intended the withholding provision to be consistent with article 33.2 of
the Convention. In interpreting article 33.2, some have suggested that "[t]he principle of
proportionality has to be observed, that is, whether the danger entailed to the refugee
by expulsion or return outweighs the menace to public security that would arise if he were
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about the alien's danger to the commiumty. Arging that the
language, which requires a consideration of dangerousness, is
redundant is inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
C. Article 33.2 of the Convention
Congress may have felt constrained by Article 33.2 of the
Convention.' 7 The purpose of the Refugee Act was to conform
domestic legislation to the Convention. Congress may have
intended to recogmze the serious nature of an aggravated felony
without disturbing this conforrmty a" Nevertheless, adherence to
the Convention's language has caused more problems than an-
ticipated.
Although courts recognize the relationship between- Article
33.2 of the Convention and section 243(h) of the INA, they have
adopted their own interpretation of section 243(h)(2)(B) on the
ground that the 'Convention provides little guidance on the mat-
ter. 89 During the Conference of Plempotentianes, the delegates
from France and the. Umted Kingdom proposed that Article 28
should allow states to pumsh activities "directed against national
security or constituting a danger to the commumty."'" The
Convention,,however, was not inclined to return to persecution of
each alien who commits a particularly serious crime.' One must
assess the alien's danger to the community on an individual basis.
An alien convicted of a major crime may be a danger to the com-
munity, whereas an alien convicted of a capital crime committed
while in a state of emotional distress may not be dangerous."
If the alien's crime resulted from an isolated incident, such as self-
permitted to stay." THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 342 (footnote omitted);
see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 63.
187. See Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1325 (7th Cir. 1993); Evangeline G. Abriel,
Presumed Ineligible: The Effect of Criminal Convictions on Applications for Asylum and
Withholding of Deportation Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 27,38 & nA.45 (1992).
188. The Senate Conference Report on the Refugee Act confirmed as follows: "The
Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the understanding that it is based
directly on the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed
consistent with the Protocol." S. CONF..REP No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
189. See Al-Salehi Y. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 395 (10th Cir. 1995); Garcia, 7 F.3d at 1325-26.
190. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries-16th meeting, supra note 87, at 7 (remarks of
Mr. Rochefort (France)).
191. See STENBERG, supra note 96, at 227; THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92,
at 342.
192. STENBERG, supra note 96, at 228.
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defense or necessity, the alien may not constitute a danger to the
community despite the seriousness of the crime.1'9
"[P]rmciples of natural justice and due process of law require
something more than mere mechanical application of the excep-
tion."194 Placing the exception in context, the alien's crime and
danger to the community must be very serious for the state to
disregard the consequences of the alien's return. 5 Article 33.2
deprives the alien of non-refoulement when the state may
reasonably regard the alien as a danger to security, and it further
deprives him of that benefit once he has been convicted of a
particularly serious crime making him a danger to the community.
Article 33.2 inquires into the reasonableness of an alien's return by
assessing the likelihood of danger to the alien against the danger
to security. 96 Similarly, the "particularly serious crime" language
provides a reasonable basis for determining an alien's "danger to
the community." The determination must consider an alien's
impact on the community only if the crime is "particularly serious."
Although non-refoulement is not absolute, Article 33.2
recognizes exceptions only for national security and danger to the
commumty'9 The Conference of Plenlpotentianes concluded
that a mere conviction was insufficient to render an alien a danger
to the community.' 9' As the United Kingdom delegate suggested,
the state must deterrmne whether the danger of expelling or
returning the alien outweighs the menace to the community if the
state allows the alien to stay.1
99
D. Proper Interpretation
The courts have not clearly identified the congressional
rationale for including the language "danger to the community."
In Mansourt v. INS,2' the alien relied on the legislative history
193. Id., THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 342; GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 95, at 96.
194. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 96.
195. Id.
196. U.N. Conference of Plempotenuarnes-16th meeting, supra note 87, at 8.
197. At the Conference of Plempotentianes, the French delegate captured the sense of
the article's exceptions when he commented that states Would be able to punish activities
that were directed against national security or threaten the community. Id. at 7. (remarks
of Mr. Rochefort (France)).
198. See STENBERG, supra note 96, at 227.
199. U.N. Conference of Plempotentianes-16th-meeting, supra note 87, at 8.
200. 32 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1994).
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for relief and directed the court's attention to previous bills that
demed relief to aliens convicted of aggravated felomes without
requiring a finding of dangerousness.2"' The Seventh Circuit,
however, refused to acknowledge any ambiguity in the statutory
language.2 Nevertheless, the court must have seen an automatic
connection between the alien's conviction.and the alien's danger to
others. The problem was that the mere conviction rendered the
alien a danger to the community.
Section 243(h)(2)(B)'s disabling feature is its determination
that an alien convicted of an aggravated felony constitutes a
danger. Perhaps the exception requires the U.S. Attorney General
to determine first whether an alien committed a particularly serious
crime before determining his dangerousness.' If the plain
meaning of the statute requires only a finding of conviction, the
remaining statutory language is gratuitous, and Congress needlessly
mentioned the effect of the conviction. The stage, therefore, was
set for ambiguity and confusion.
Although the BIA and the courts have required only a finding
of conviction,2 " some circuit courts have conceded that the issue
remains unresolved. In Mosquera-Perez v. INS,205 the First
Circuit acknowledged that the statutory language was more
ambiguous than the alien suggested.2°  The court noted the
alien's powerful argument that the. language "danger to the
community" is irrelevant if a mere conviction was dispositive of the
alien's eligibility for relief2 ' The court, however, found that
Congress could have specified its intent to require a dual finding
by merely including the word "and" between the clauses in section
201. Id. at 1022. One bill would have added the following paragraph to section
243(h)(2) without any reference to dangerousness: "(E) The alien has been convicted of
an aggravated felony as defined under section 101(a)(43) of this Act." 136 CONG. REC.
S11942 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (discussing S. 2957). The intent of this amendment was to
deny "aliens convicted of murder, drug trafficking, and other aggravated
felonies relief." Id. (section-by-section analysis).
202. Mansourz, 32 F3d at 1022.
203. In Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993), the court noted that Congress
knew how to condition relief on an alien's dangerousness. The question remains why
Congress would condition relief on an alien's dangerousness if a mere aggravated felony
conviction rendered the alien a danger to the community.
204. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
205. 3 F.3d 553 (Ist Cir. 1993).
206. Id. at 555-56.
207. Id. at 556.
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243(h)(2)(B). 21  Dissatisfied with the plain meaning approach,
the court examined the legislative history but still found no
resolution.' 9 Therefore, the court followed the BIA's interpreta-
tion in Carballe, holding that it was not "unreasonable, arbitrary,
or capricious.,
210
The Tenth Circuit recently agreed that Congress could have
avoided confusion by inserting the word "and" between the clauses
in section 243(h)(2)(B);21' it also acknowledged that Congress
could have used plain language if it intended that an alien's
conviction should satisfy the element of dangerousness.
212
Confronted with this uncertainty, the Tenth Circuit joined the First
Circuit and deferred to the BIA's interpretation.
2 1 3
In Garcia v. INS,214 the Seventh Circuit also relied on the
statutory text. The court reminded the alien that the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits had rejected a dual finding requirement
based on the statute's grammatical structure.215 Those courts
found a cause and effect relationship between the two clauses of
section 243(h)(2)(B). 16  Both the Mosquera-Pere217 and Gar-
cia218 courts, however, recogmzed the U.S. Attorney General's
authority to release an alien from custody pending exclusion if the
alien could show that he was not a danger to others. 9 This pos-
sibility exists despite the 1990 Act, which makes an aggravated
felony a particularly serious crime. The courts concede that aliens
convicted of particularly serious crimes may still prove they are not
208. Id. This grammatical solution made an early appearance in Crespo-Gomez v.
Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986), where the court said: "The statute does not
connect its two clauses with a conjunction; rather the statute sets forth a cause and effect
relationship: the fact that the alien has committed a particularly serious crime makes the
alien dangerous within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 934. Other circuits have seen
this as a compelling point. See Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987);
Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1992).
209. Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 558 (1st Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 559.
211. AI-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 1995).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 396.
214. Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993).
215. d. at 1323 (citing Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d. 657, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1992) (per
cunam); Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394,1397 (9th Cir. 1987); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845
F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1985)).
216. Id.
217. 3 F.3d 553, 556 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1993).
218. 7 F.3d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993).
219. INA § 236(e)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3)(C) (1994).
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a threat to the commumty. This concession blurs the cause and
effect relationship between the two clauses in section 243(h)(2)(B)
because an automatic finding that an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony is dangerous is inconsistent with a finding that
the alien does not represent a danger to the community.
IV PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL OPINION
A. Neutrality
An alien may obtain relief by showing persecution on account
of political opumon. ° - Both the BIA and the courts, however,
have found difficulty in interpreting the language "on account of
political opinion." The issue frequently arises when an alien seeks
relief because his failure to join a guerrilla movement' places him
in danger. From the BIA's perspective, the alien should qualify for
relief "on account of political' opinion" only if he expresses, a
viewpoint that is offensive to the persecutor." Resisting a
guerrilla movement, therefore, is insufficient to establish a threat
of persecution on account of political opinion.
In In re Vigil,' the BIA distinguished between "politically
motivated harm" and harm related to the alien's "offensive
political opimon."'  The guerrillas preferred to pursue their
political goals rather than punish an alien for his individual
views. 4 The guerrillas could form a potent political force only
if their numbers increased. Thus, the guerrillas' sphere of influence
depended upon the success of their recruiting efforts.
The judicial approach to the "political opinion" doctnne has
been more favorable to the alien.? Courts have interpreted an
alien's refusal to join a guerrilla movement as an expression of a
political opinion because it impedes the guerrillas' political objec-
tives, thus givmg the guerrillas reason to conform the alien to their
220. Section 243(h) provides relief if the alien can show that his "life or freedom would
be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership m a particular-
social group, or political opinion." Id. § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (emphasis added).
221. In re Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988); In re Acosta, 19 1. & N.
Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
222. 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988).
223. Id. at 576.
224. Id. at 577.
225. See, e.g., Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788,791 (9th Cir. 1989); Arteaga v. INS,
836 F.2d 1227, 1231. (9th Cir. 1988); Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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way of thinking.
The Ninth Circuit has taken the lead in interpreting "political
opinion," which has been-an important issue when an alien remains
neutral in an internal conflict. In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS ,
6
the Ninth Circuit sympathized with the alien and held that
neutrality was as much a political decision as affiliation with a
particular political faction. The alien's motive to remain neutral
seemed to constitute a political choice22 that did not concern the
court.228 The court also found that the guerrillas were not con-
cerned with the alien's reasons for refusing to join the organization
but only with the alien's conduct, which reflected a political
opinion in opposition to their own.229 Therefore, the court found
that any ensuing persecution resulted from that political opinion
and not the alien's motives.230
Similarly, in Arteaga v. INS,"1 the court held that it is irrele-
vant whether guerrillas want to draft an alien into their ranks or
punish him for his neutrality. 2 The court acknowledged that the
guerrillas' forced recruitment of the alien was politically motivat-
ed.33 Therefore, once the alien manifested a political opimon,
the court assumed that any ensuing persecution was on account of
that opinion.
Most recently, in Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that an alien's refusal to stay with a guerrilla
group was an expression of political opinion. 5 The alien's
refusal frustrated the guerrillas' political objective, thus motivating
the guerrillas to punish the alien. 6 Fortunately, the alien did
not have to establish a link between the expression of that opinion
and the guerrillas' motives. The alien escaped from the guerrillas
and did not articulate any political opinion. The court inferred the
existence of a political opinion from the alien's conduct and the
guerrillas' political motivation for persecuting the alien followed
226. 767 F.2d at 1277.
227. Id. at 1286.
228. Id. at 1287.
229. Id.
230. Id. See also Argueta v. INS. 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985).
231. 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1980).
232. Id. at 1-232 n.8.
233. Id. at 1232.
234. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
235. Id. at 791.
236. Id. at 791-92.
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from that scenario.
The.Eleventh Circuit has not been so accommodating to the
alien. In Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigrationl"
the court rejected the scenario of neutrality that the.Ninth Circuit
accepted in Bolanos-Hernandez. Rather, the court accepted the
BIA's view in Maldonado-Cruz, where the alien feared the
guerrillas because he had deserted the group and not. because he
had remained neutral." The Perlera-Escobar court was unwil-
ling to follow the Ninth. Circuit's approach. 9 The court declined
to decide the neutrality question, stating that the alien would not
have qualified for relief even if neutrality was a political opimon.
The alien could neither show that he had openly articulated his
political opinion nor that the guerrillas had pursued hin because
he remained neutral.2" The fact that the guerrillas did .not
forcibly recruit" the alien may have swayed the court. This factor
indicates that the guerrillas were merely interested in returning the
alien to the group rather than in harming him on account of his
political views. Because a guerrilla operation depends on the
loyalty of its participants, the guerrillas' efforts to maintain order
and discipline may not always lead to persecution on account of
political opinion.
The Fourth Circuit has declined to accept or reject neutrality
as a political opmion;242 however, it has suggested that even if it
recognized the doctrine, it would follow the Ninth Circuit's
approach and require an alien to show that he affirmatively
decided to remain neutral.2 3 Additionally, the alien must show
that he "has received some threat or could be singled out for
persecution on account of his" neutrality2"
In Novoa-Umania v. INS,24 the First Circuit was more
237. 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990).
238. See id. at 1297 & n.4.
239. The court carefully noted that it was not holding that a guerrilla may never show
persecution on account of political opinion; however, the former guerilla must prove that
the guerrillas were pursuing him "to overcome a recognized political opinion." Id. at 1299.
240. Id. at 1298.
241. Id. at 1297 n.4.
242. Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that "an
absence of the requisite probability of persecution" rendered it unnecessary to express an
opinion).
243. See M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
244. Id.
245. 896 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1990).
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a reasonable person would fear one of the following:
1) that a group with the power to persecute him intends to do
so specifically because the group dislikes neutrals, or 2) that
such a group intends to persecute him because he will not accept
its political point of view, or 3) that one or more such groups
intend to persecute him because each (incorrectly) thinks he
holds the political views of the other side.2"
This test links neutrality to the doctnne of imputed political
opinion, which gained favor in the Ninth Circuit when persecutors
attributed political beliefs to an alien from the alien's acts or
decisions.247
Just when the concept of neutrality seemed to be gaining
ground, the U.S. Supreme Court decided INS v. Elias-Zacaras2'
In Elias-Zacartas, the alien refused to join the guerrilla movement
in Guatemala because he feared government retaliation.249 He left
Guatemala because he feared that the guerrillas would harm him.
The Court addressed the issue "whether a guerrilla organization's
attempt to coerce a person into performing military service neces-
sarily constitutes 'persecution on account of political opm-
ion.' ,,2S0
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the ordinary meaning of
the phrase "persecution on account of political opinion" relates to
the victim's, not the persecutor's, political opimon. 1 The. Court
considered the alien's contention that his neutrality was itself a
political opinon" and held that it was "not ordinarily so."5 3
The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the alien
held a political opimon. The alien first had to prove, through
either direct or circumstantial evidence, that he would have been
persecuted due to his opinion rather than his refusal to join the
guerrillas.' Although the Court did not rule out neutrality as an
expression of political opinion, it did not indicate when neutrality
246. Id. at 3.
247. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432
(9th Cir. 1987).
248. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
249. Id. at 480.
250. Id. at 479.
251. Id. at 482.
252. Id. at 483.
253. INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
254. Id.
1996]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
guerrillas.254 Although the Court did not rule out neutrality as
an expression of political opinion, it did not indicate when
neutrality would constitute grounds for relief.
B. The Question of Motive
Aliens have difficulty proving persecution on account of
political opinion when they cannot make the causal connection
between their opinions and the persecution they face. The BIA
has consistently required the alien to show both the effects of
persecution and the persecutor's intent to pumsh the alien because
of the alien's beliefs. For example, in In .re Maldonado-Cruz, 5
the alien feared retaliation from the guerrillas for desertion, but the
BIA found that the guerrillas were merely imposing military
discipline. In Campos-Guardado v. INS, 6 the Fifth Circuit
accepted the BIA's decision to deny relief to an alien who was
raped and whose relatives were brutally murdered while visiting
her home in El Salvador. Neither the BIA nor the court found
that the alien was harmed on account of any actual or imputed
political opimon 57
Unlike other circuits, the Ninth Circuit examines both the
persecutor's and alien's motives."8 In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
the court looked to the persecutor's motives. 9 The court found
that if the alien did not engage in any criminal activity or other
conduct that would justify governmental action, then there was a
presumption that any persecution was politically motivated.26
This was a step forward for the alien because he did not have to
prove the persecutor's motive. The court recognized that the
persecutor would not tolerate a difference of opimon between
himself and the victm. 261 The Ninth Circuit also recogiized a
difference between the conscription efforts of the guerrillas and
those of a legitimate govermnent. 262 Because guerrilla groups
have no legitimate authority to conscript members, the court
254. Id.
255. 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988).
256. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.,1987).
257. Id. at 288.
258. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
259. Id. at 517.
260. Id. at 516.
261. Id. at 517.
262. Zacanas v. INS, 908 F.2d 1452, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1990).
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presumed that any resistance constituted an expression. of the
alien's political opinion.2  The Ninth Circuit eventually became
uncomfortable with this presumption and acknowledged that other
reasons may explain an alien's refusal to join a guerrilla group.2"
In INS. v. Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the guerrillas' attempted conscription of an alien did not neces-
sarily constitute persecution on account of political opinion."
Therefore, the alien had to prove he met the statutory re-
quirements. First, the alien had to show that he refused to join the
guerrillas for personal political reasons. This is significant because
the Court was concerned that an alien could resist recruitment for
reasons unrelated to his political opinion.26 Second, the alien
had to show that the guerrillas persecuted him because of his
opmion.2 67
The Court's decision creates difficulties for an alien who
remains neutral by resisting conscription. Resistance alone does
not necessarily constitute a political statement. This standard
disadvantages an alien, who must ensure that the persecutor knows
his political reasons for not joining the guerrilla organization.2'
An alien who offers a nonpolitical reason does not enjoy statutory
protection.IIn Rivas-Martinez v. INS 69 the alien had a nonpolitical
motive for not joining the guerrilla orgamzation. She rejected the
guerrillas because she had to care for her young daughter. The
BIA denied her relief because the guerrillas did not know of her
political opposition.27 The BIA held that the alien had a nonpo-
liticgl reason for not cooperating with the guerrillas and, thus, any
resulting persecution was not on account of political opinion.27'
263. Id. at 1456; Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988).
264. See Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the guerrillas'
refusal to allow the alien to farm in a particular area does not raise a presumption of
persecution on account of political opinion). See also Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546,549 (9th
Cir. 1990).
265: INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
266. Id. at 482.
267. Id. at 483.
268. The Court stated that the alien had to show "that the guerrillas [would] persecute
him because of [his] political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them."
Id. (emphasis in original).
269. 997 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993).
270. Id. at 1146.
271. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit considered the BIA's requirement-that the alien
confront armed guerrillas with a political reason for her resistance
and put herself in danger-as unrealistic.272 The court under-
stood the alien's unwillingness to confront the guerrillas, and
refused to deny relief solely because the alien had a nonpolitical
reason for not cooperating with the guerrillas. 273 The court noted
that just because an alien commumcates a nonpolitical reason to
the guerrillas does not necessarily mean that the guerrillas believe
her. Thus, the alien could obtain relief by showing that the
guerrillas knew the real reason for her reluctance to join the
groupY4 This enlightened approach puts an alien in a difficult
position by requiring him to show that his stated reason was a
camouflage and that the guerrillas knew the real reason for her op-
position.
The U.S. Supreme Court requires only some evidence of the
persecutor's motive. The alien must show through direct or
circumstantial evidence that the persecutors knew about the alien's
political opimon and sought to persecute based on that
opimon.275 Where persecution may stem from various causes, the
alien must connect the persecution to a protected cause.2 6 Tis
is particularly problematic when the alien gives a specific reason for
opposing the guerrillas. Under the Elias-Zacarzas test, an alien has
a stronger case for asylum when his reasons for resistance are
272. Id. at 1147.
273. Id.
274. The court followed Elias-Zacaras in requirng the alien to prove that she had
political motives and was persecuted because of her political opinion. Rivas-Martinez v.
INS, 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 483
(1992)).
275. INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Although the Court did not
require direct proof of the persecutor's motives, it did not define "political opinion" or
whether the alien held one. Id. at 483. See Deborah Anker et al., The Supreme Court's
Decision in INS, v. Elias-Zacanas: Is There Any "There" There?, 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 285, 287 (1992).
276. In Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992), the court denied relief based
on religious persecution, but granted relief based on imputed political opinion. The court
interpreted Elias-Zacartas as follows:
The Court explained that in those cases in which a persecuted activity could stem
from many causes, some protected by the statute and others unprotected, the
victim must tie the persecution to a protected cause. To do this, the victim needs
to show the persecutor had a protected basis (such as the victim's political
opinion) in mind in undertaking the persecution. Although the Court discusses
this requirement in light of the narrow "political opinion" grounds for relief, we
find no good reason not to apply it in the religious context as well.
Id. at 601.
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political rather than nonpolitical.
In Elias-Zacarias, the alien failed to prove that persecution
would result from his political opimon rather than his failure to
join the guerrillas. The Court noted that the alien's evidence must
be so compelling that "no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution."2' Therefore, an alien must not
merely show that the guerrillas were on a large-scale hunt for
recruits but that they had a political motive.78 Tius new stan-
dard disabled the Ninth Circuit's approach of overlooking the
nexus between the alien's conduct and the persecutor's motive.
Even when no legitimate basis for persecution exists, the court is
obligated to consider the persecutor's motve 9  The BIA and
the Ninth Circuit have disagreed on this point in the past.
280
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Elias-Zacaras, however, the
Ninth Circuit lacked support for its approach and acknowledged
the BIA'S inquiry into political motive.
Other circuits have not necessarily followed the BIA's
approach. In Osono v. INS, s1 the BIA found that the
Guatemalan government had persecuted the alien but dismissed
the persecutors' political motives .as irrelevant.' The Second
Circuit held that the BIA did, not accurately interpret the cor-
relation observed in Elias-Zacaras between the guerrillas' conscnp-
tion policies and persecution on account of political opimon.2s
Although the U.S. Supreme Court considered the persecutor's
motive an important factor, the alien had to connect that motive
277. Elias-Zacaras, 502 U.S. at 484.
278. The Court emphasized the intent element. Id at 483. Although the statute does
not mention intent, the Court presumed to rely on the ordinary meaning of the words used.
Id. at 482. Although the statute and the Protocol have a humanitarian objective, intent
would be relevant if the statute punished the persecutors. See Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable
Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections From Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1179, 1192 (1994).
279. In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985), the court presumed that
government action is politically motivated when no legitimate basis for government action
exists. This presumption enabled the alien to obtain relief.
280. In In re Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 515-16 (BIA 1988), the BIA held
that no persecution on account of political opinion existed because the guerrillas had no
political motive in pursuing the alien. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, and held that
the alien's refusal to support the guerrillas' cause constituted a political opinion that led
to the alien's persecution. Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989).
281. 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994).
282. Id. at 1029.
283. Id.
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with the ensuing persecution.
The Second Circuit found that the BIA had mischaractenzed
as ,an economic dispute the friction between the alien and the
government over umon activities and workers' rights.2  The
court overruled the BIA's decision, holding that Osono's agitation
for higher wages and civil liberties posed a political threat to the
government and that it could not simply ignore the alien's position
because. the alien hoped to produce better conditions for the umon
members. The court noted that, "Osono's activities clearly
evince[d] the political opimon that strikes by municipal workers
should be legal and that workers should be given more rights."'
2
The government sought to suppress the expression of these beliefs
because they politically threatened its authority.
An alien need not show that persecution is solely on account
of political opinion.2 7 Thus, confusion may arise when different
considerations surround the dispute between the persecutor and
the alien. In Osoro, the mere existence of an economic motive did
not necessarily preclude other causes of persecution. Although the
dispute appeared to be economically motivated, the alien's political
opinions caused the persecution. -m  Elias-Zacaras does not
require an alien to base his claim on only one ground. Thus, the
fact that an alien fears persecution on more than one ground
should not disqualify him for relief'
In Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the plain
statutory language in requmng the alien to show the persecutor's
motive. Although the language "on account of" suggests that the
persecution must stem from the alien's political opimon, it does not
explicitly require the alien to prove the persecutor's motive.2"
284. Id. at 1029-30.
285. Id. at 1030.
286. Osono v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1994).
287. Id. at 1028.
288. The UNHCR Handbook recognizes the difficulty m isolating the economic from
the political elements:
[W]hat appears at first sight to be primarily an economc motive for departure
may in reality also involve a political element, and it may be the political opinions
of the individual that expose him to serious 'consequences, rather than his
objections to the economic measures themselves.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 130, at para. 64.
289. The Court has made motive "critical" when persecution may result from various
reasons. As a result, it will be more difficult for the alien to show the persecutor's motives.
See INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
290. Musalo, supra note 278, at 1194.
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This motive requirement is inconsistent with Congress' intent to
conform the Refugee Act to the Convention.2 91 The Refugee
Act's humanitarian goals suggest a liberal reading of the
statute,2' and do not require an alien to prove the persecutor's
true motive. Additiofally, proving intent becomes especially
difficult for an alien who cannot obtain the required documentation
against persecutors engaging in mass terrorism.29 -
C. Imputed Political Opinion
Any persecution must be on account of the alien's political
opinion.29 4 An issue arises whether an alien is eligible for relief
when he does not have a political opinion but the persecutor thinks
otherwise. Imputed political opinion occurs when a persecutor
incorrectly attributes a political opinion to the alien and persecutes
the alien based on that false attribution.295
Prior to Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit protected an alien
against persecution based on imputed political opimon.296 In
Elias-Zacartas, the U.S. Supreme Court implied the vitality of the
imputed political opinion doctrine in observing that the guerrillas
did not erroneously believe that the alien's refusal was politically
based.2' The Court, however, did not commit itself to the
doctrine's viability. Following Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit
confirmed that "imputed political opinion [was] still a valid basis
for relief."29  Additionally, m Canas-Segovia v. INS,2  the
291. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
421 (1984).
292. See T. Alexander Alemikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution" in United States Asylum
Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 11 (1991); Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation
Explosion"- The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 413, 469; Musalo, supra note 278, at 1194.
293. Johnson, supra note 292, at 468.
294. The Elias-Zacartas Court stated: "The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution
on account of political opinion' in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim's
political opinion, not the persecutor's." INS v. Elias-Zacanas, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (e-
mphasis in original).
295. Ranmrez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds,
502 U.S. 1025 (1992); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985); UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 130, at paras. 80-83.
296. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d
1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
297. The Court stated as follows: "Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it
would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacanas' refusal was
politically based." 502 U.S. at 482 (1992) (emphasis in original).
298. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 11992).
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court inferred an element of motive in the imputed political
opimondoctnne.
The imputed political opinion doctrine requires an mqury into
whether the alien's opinion controls. In the absence of an actual
political opinion, the alien must prove that the persecution resulted
from an imputed political opinion. Thus, a political motive does
not emanate from the alien, but the persecutor attributes a political
motive to him.W
The imputation theory obscures the traditional understanding
of "political opinion" because the alien's actual belief becomes
irrelevant. Even assumng that the imputation theory would
suffice, the U.S. Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias asserted that the
alien's opinion was the controlling factor and denied the alien
relief.
In Nasseri v. Moschorak, °1 the Ninth Circuit applied the
imputation theory and did not require-the alien to prove that her
involvement in a resistance movement motivated her attackers.
The alien, however, proved that because of her public support for
the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA)-a group that
advocated the return of a constitutional monarchy-she incurred
the wrath of the fundamentalist mujahudin rebels.2 Surprisingly,
the court did not rely on the prominence of the alien's NIFA af-
filiations to support a finding of political persecution. Rather the
court relied on the unputation theory because the persecutors
inferred that the alien was a political enemy from her activities.3 3
An issue arises whether persecution is on account of political
opinion when the persecutors primarily seek information from the
alien.3"4 In Nasseri, the kidnappers' belief that the alien was
299. Id. at 602.
300. See Artlip, supra note 36, at 582; Bruce J. Einhorn, Political Asylum in the Ninth
Circuit and the Case of Elias-Zacartas, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV 597, 610-11 (1992).
301. 34 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1994).
302. Id. at 729.
303. The court believed that the persecutors "were not simply trying to discover whether
or not she held certain views but, rather, that they believed she knew something that she
wasn't revealing." Id. at 730. Th1is raised the question whether the persecutors were more
interested in obtaining information regarding Nasseri's -colleagues than in persecuting her
because of her political opinion.
304. Compare In re R-, Int.Dec. No. 3195 (BIA 1992) (holding that intent to extract
information about Sikh militants was not persecution on account of political opinion) with
Singh v. ilchert, 801 F Supp. 313 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that policemen's interest in
getting information from alien did not preclude possibility that policemen wanted to punish
alien for supporting militants).
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A persecutor's motive for extracting information from an alien
does not necessarily preclude a finding of persecution on account
of imputed political opimon. In Singh v. llchert,315 the court
properly categorized police action as persecution on account of
political. opimon because the police believed the alien was'a
supporter of the Sikh terronsts. 306 This generalized political motive
did not preclude a finding that the persecution resulted from police
perceptions of the alien's position.0 7 Any elicited information
from the alien did not detract from the persecutor's underlying
motive.3°
In Shirazi-Parsa v. INS,309 the Ninth Circuit examined more
closely the persecutor's motive. The aliens' contact with the
Argentine military caused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to
suspect the aliens of political disloyalty.310 The court concluded
that Iran's interest in the aliens was "political m nature."311 The
court exemplified true application of the doctrine rn stating that:
"[w]hether or not Petitioner actually held the beliefs that the
regime attributed to hun, it is enough that the regime 'falsely
attributes an opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim
because of that mistaken belief about the victim's views.' "312
Thus the alien's views were irrelevant because the persecutors'
suspicion of political disloyalty was enough to invoke the im-
putation theory.
In Fisher v. INS,31 3 the alien claimed that the regime's
interest in her was political because the same regime imprisoned
her brother-rn-law and searched her house.1 4 The Ninth Circuit
accepted this "totality of the circumstances" approach as a viable
means of demonstrating persecution on account of imputed
305. 801 F Supp. 313 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
306. Id. at 319.
307. See Sachin D. Adarkar, Comment, Political Asylum and Political Freedom Moving
Towards a Just Definition of "Persecution on Account of Political Opinion" Under the
Refugee Act, 42 UCLA L. REV. 181, 198 (1994).
308. Similarly, in Desir v. 1lchert, the court held that the fact that the persecutors
demanded money did not preclude a finding of persecution based on imputed political
opinion. Desir v. ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988).
309. 14 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994).
310. Id. at 1426.
311. Id. at 1430.
312. Id. (citing Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1992)).
313. 37 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
314. Id. at 1383.
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In Fisher v. INS,313 the alien claimed that the regime's
interest m her was political because the same regime imprisoned
her brother-in-law and searched her house.314 The Ninth Circuit
accepted this "totality of the circumstances" approach as a viable
means of demonstrating persecution on account of imputed
political opinion.315  Furthermore, the court recogmzed that the
evidence required to prove that the authorities considered the alien
an "enemy of the regime" may differ from that required to prove
an intent -to persecute the alien for other reasons.3 6 The court
reflected on the difference between imputed political opinion and
intent to persecute an alien due to a moral code violation.3"
Imputed political opinion may be easier to establish when a
persecutor makes a bona fide attribution to the alien. When the
persecutor knowingly attributes a false political opinion to the
alien, however, it may be more difficult to prove persecution.318
This stretches the doctrine of imputed political opinion to bring
this scenario within the statute's scope.
Lazo-Majano v. INS319 involved a Salvadoran military officer
who abused and tormented a woman whom he had branded as a
subversive. The court noted that political persecution upon a
subversive opposing the government was the most compelling
example of a political opimon.3" The court further stated that
the relevant issue was the cynical imputation of a political opimon
to the alien, not whether the alien had a political opinion.321
Thus, persecution on a personal level may be on account of
political opimon when the persecutor cymcally attributes an
313. 37 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
314. Id. at 1383.
315. Id. at 1384.
316. Id.
317. The court noted that "if the evidence establishes that one of the reasons for the
existence and enforcement of a generally applicable law is to oppress those with minority
religious views, the existence of the necessary motive is clear." Id. at 1383. After the
Supreme Court decided Elias-Zacartas, the Fisher court remanded the case to allow the
alien an opportunity to show the persecutor's motive. See id.
318. See Artlip, supra note 36, at 584. But see Linda D. Bevis, Comment, "Political
Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International Sources, 63 WASH. L. REv. 395,412 n.109
(1988).
319. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
320. Id. at 1435.
321. Id.
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opinion for self-serving reasons.'a The political opinion is
essentially outside the alien's control.
Under the imputed political opinion doctrine, the alien's belief
is not an issue. The objective of granting the alien relief when a
persecutor genuinely attributes a political opinion to the alien is
not furthered when the alien lacks a political opinion.3z There
is no attempt to punish any political opinion because it does not
exist.
V CONCLUSION
Many aliens view asylum or withholding of deportation as their
last hope of avoiding suffering back in their homeland. The
Refugee Act of 1980 gave meaning to that hope. Congress
amended INA section 243(h) to further protect such aliens, making
the provision mandatory and applicable .to aliens in exclusion
proceedings.324  Although Congress intended to ,conform the'
statutory exceptions to those of the Convention,325 courts have
deferred to the BIA's interpretation of section 243(h)(2)(B)'s
language linking conviction for a particularly serious crime to the
alien's dangerousness. The BIA's interpretation leaves much to be
desired in light of the legislation's underlying objectives. Unfor-
tunately, Congress may have further confused the issue by denying
asylum relief to an alien convicted of an aggravated felony326 but
defining an aggravated felony as a particularly serious crime in the
322. In Lazo-Malano, Judge Poole dissented as follows: "Quite simply, the majority has
outdone Lewis Carroll m its application of the term 'political opinion' and in finding that
male domnation in such a personal relationship constitutes political persecution." Id. at
1437.
323. See Artlip, supra note 36, at 584.
324. Refugee Act, supra note 4, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107.
325. The Conference Report indicated as follows:
The Senate Bill provided for withholding deportation of aliens to countnes where
they would face persecution, unless their deportation would be permitted under
the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The House amendment provided a similar withholding procedure unless any
of four specific conditions (those set forth in the aforementioned international
agreements) were met.
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the understan-
ding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended
that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol.
S. CONF REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1980).
326. "An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony may not apply for
or be granted asylum." INA § 208(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994).
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withholding provision. 27 Congress can make these provisions
consistent; however, it risks inviting further inqumes into the U.S.
Attorney General's discretion to release aggravated felons m other
contexts. 32 Nonetheless, the U.S. Attorney General should not
deport an aggravated felon facing persecution abroad unless that
alien constitutes a serious threat to the commumty.
29
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council,330 the United States can implement a
policy complying withithe international norm of extraterrtorial
non-refoulement. Considering the Court's decision as relying on
domestic rather than international law, authorities may enforce
non-refoulement, which prohibits the alien's return in any manner
whatsoever 331  Reaffirrmng this principle would revitalize the
Umted States' previous commitment to protecting refugees.3
327- "For purposes of subparagraph (B), an alien who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime." Id.
§ 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2).
328. See id. § 236(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)(3).
329. The following commentary is helpful:
As to paragraph 2 it constitutes an exception to the general principle embodied
in paragraph 1 and has, like all exceptions, to be interpreted restrictively As
to criminal activities, the word "crmes" is not to be understood m the technical
sense of any criminal code but simply signifies a serious criminal offence. Two
conditions must be fulfilled: the refugee must have been convicted by final
judgment for a particularly serious crime, and he must constitute a danger to the
community of the country.
THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 342.
330. Professor Koh noted that this norm has not only been embodied in the 1951
Convention, but also in INA § 243(h) and the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement. He further
stated: "[t]he Haitian Centers Council litigation can thus be understood as an unsuccessful
attempt by private litigants to convince the. Supreme Court to internalize the norm of
extraterritorial nonrefoulement as United States domestic law." Harold H. Koh, Refugees,
the Courts and the New World Order, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 999, 1015-16 (1994).
331.. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 105. The U.N. High Commission for
Refugees considered the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
a setback in international law. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S.
Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215, 1215 (1993).
332. U.S. Ambassador Moore's comments at a U.N. meeting m 1987 exemplify this
commitment:
Considering that the most important element of a refugee's protection was the
obligation of non-refoulement, it was tragic that refugees had been forced to
return to their countries against their will and without assurances that they would
not face persecution on their return, especially when such violations were
committed by, or with the concurrence of, States parties to international
instruments prohibiting such acts.
Exec Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Summary
Record of 415th mtg. at 5, UN. Doc. A/AC.96/SR.415 (1987).
U.S. Ambassador Lafontant, who succeeded Ambassador Moore, expressed similar
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One still may solve this problem because Sale does not require
state action but merely allows the alien's return.
The Court's interpretation in INS v. Elias-Zacaras33 of
persecution "on account of political opimon" puts an alien in a
rather difficult position by requiring hun to prove why his persecu-
tors would want to act against him. This approach overlooks the
fact that persecutors hardly ever act on mere philosophical
opposition to an alien's opimons? A plain meaning interpreta-
tion in this context runs counter to the Court's previous liberal
interpretation in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.335 In light of the
motive requirement of Elias-Zacartas, inugration judges should
examine the totality of the circumstances relating to an alien's
claim to determine what reasonable inferences they can draw from
that context about the persecutor's motive. It is only by doing so
that they can take proper account of the political environment that
gives rise to the claim of persecution.
sentiments. Exec. Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., Summary Record of 437th mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. AIAC.96/SR.437 (1989).
333. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
334. See id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarkar, supra note 307, at 211; Johnson,
supra note 292, at 468.
335. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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